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The constant development of unprecedented problems requires a legal
system capable of fluidity and pliancy. Our society would be strait-
jacketed were not the courts, with the able assistance of the lawyers,
constantly overhauling the law and adapting it to the realities of
ever-changing social, industrial and political conditions.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Not unlike before the biblical flood, the world stands on the brink
of catastrophe awaiting rescue by a virtual ark.  The most vulnerable
to this looming catastrophe are the world’s wildlife.  Changes in global
temperature and precipitation as well as sea level rise and acidifica-
tion of the ocean are already affecting wildlife by limiting the availa-
bility and quality of habitat and the abundance of prey, and by
increasing predation and disease.2  Sea level rise and unstable storm
patterns threaten coastal wildlife, while changing precipitation and
temperature patterns are drying out habitat, making some habitat
more susceptible to wildfires, and other habitat too cold or too hot.
These weather changes are creating pressure on wildlife to move from
the increasingly inhospitable places they currently occupy to more
suitable locations.3  As wildlife move, human obstacles make their
journey harder.  Neither federal laws nor private land protection
1. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Lands Law, 14 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 269, 308–09, n.182 (1980) (quoting JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND 12–13 (1930)).
2. Jaclyn Lopez, Biodiversity on the Brink: The Role of Assisted Migration in Man-
aging Endangered Species Threatened by Rising Seas, 39 HARV. ENVTL. REV. 157,
161–62 (2015).
3. Jonathan W. Atwell, Dawn M. O’Neal, & Ellen D. Ketterson, Animal Migration
as a Moving Target for Conservation: Intra-Species Variation and Responses to
Environmental Change as Illustrated in a Sometimes Migratory Songbird, 41
ENVTL L. 289, 310–11 (2011) (“[C]limate change and habitat alteration have the
potential to lead to geographic range shifts, changes in intra- or inter-species
competition, and even the cessation of migration altogether.”).
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mechanisms, like conservation easements or land trusts, have suffi-
cient elasticity to protect migrating wildlife from interference during
their journey to more suitable habitat.  This Article’s supposition is
that unless flexibility can be found in either public or private law to
protect wildlife as it moves, many species of wildlife may not survive.
The Article examines how law might be used to protect shifting wild-
life habitat needs when it is not known when and where those new
needs will arise.
One thing that climate change does is challenge the capacity of ex-
isting federal laws and private property mechanisms to loosen their
attachment to a particular geographic place so that wildlife are still
protected when they move to avoid the effects of climate change—a
need not envisioned when these measures were put into place.  Rather
than parse existing federal laws to see if they might be interpreted to
protect new, as-yet unoccupied habitat and migratory corridors, this
Article searches for elasticity in common law property principles, like
the public trust doctrine, to see if they might be more effective.
The public trust doctrine is firmly embedded in state law and has
been used at the state level for centuries to protect water-based trust
resources and traditional public uses of those resources without hav-
ing to actually acquire or condemn the land.4  But relying on states to
use the doctrine to protect moving wildlife is problematic as migration
corridors may cross multiple political boundaries, including national
ones, and may encounter local opposition that is hard for a state to
overcome.  These problems with the doctrine’s application at the state
level could result in a patchwork of protected property too small and
isolated to be successful as alternative habitat for many species and in
fragmented migratory corridors that lack the necessary connectivity
between segments.  A federal version of the public trust doctrine, how-
ever, could transcend political borders and protect sufficient land to
assure migrating wildlife safe passage.5  A federal public trust doc-
4. For articles describing the origins of the public trust doctrine and its various uses
see generally, Hope M. Babcock, Is Using the Public Trust Doctrine to Protect Pub-
lic Parkland from Visual Pollution Justifiable Doctrinal Creep?, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q.
1 (2015); Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing its Recent Past
& Charting Its Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665 (2012); Joseph L. Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public
Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19
ENVTL. L. 425 (1989).
5. For an interesting example of the use of the public trust doctrine at the federal
level, see Karl Coplan, Public Trust Limits on Greenhouse Gas Trading Schemes:
A Sustainable Middle Ground?, 35 COL. J. ENVTL. L. 287, 304–05 (2016) (conclud-
ing that “[t]he public trust doctrine is a fundamental limit on sovereign power
enforceable through the Tenth Amendment reservation of the rights of the peo-
ple; that the public trust doctrine, as such, can limit congressional action; and
that the public trust doctrine’s scope extends beyond the navigable waters to in-
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trine would also sidestep the need to achieve political consensus
among competing stakeholders, as would be required for any collabo-
rative effort at the state or local level.  However, the existence of a
federal public trust doctrine is untested in the courts and very contro-
versial.  Additionally, although the doctrine has evolved through the
centuries to reflect modern values, its application to upland wildlife
habitat is uncertain.
I argue in this Article that there are at least three theoretic bases
for a federal version of the public trust doctrine.  First, nothing in the
doctrine confines its use to the states; second, the close parallels be-
tween state and federal powers with respect to protecting and manag-
ing natural resources invite parallelisms between the sources of the
doctrine; and third, the Ninth Amendment offers a constitutional
purchase for it.  At a minimum, the doctrine, in any form, offers inter-
pretative principles that might assist federal courts in assessing the
legality of barriers to wildlife migration, regardless of whether they
arise on public or private land.
To make the use of a federal public trust doctrine more politically
palatable, the Article proposes to deploy it cautiously and modestly by
anchoring its use to wildlife migrating off public lands.  A combination
of a strong protective federal interest in wildlife that resides even tem-
porarily on public lands and trust responsibility over public lands may
provide a basis for protecting wildlife as it moves across unprotected
land to the next federal preserve.  Additionally, the Article suggests
that the doctrine should be used only to prevent complete conversion
of private lands to a use that is hostile to migrating wildlife or to en-
courage the temporary removal of migratory barriers.  Private land-
owners could prevent the doctrine’s application by entering into an
agreement with the appropriate federal agency.  These agreements
would function like restrictive covenants that attach to the property’s
title, and would be duly recorded—hence enforceable if the restric-
tions were ignored.  This flexibility would allow development of trust-
imprinted lands where development can be designed in a way that
does not impede migrating wildlife.
Because of uncertainty about when, where, and how wildlife will
respond to climate change and hence where migratory corridors or fu-
ture protected areas will need to be, this Article also proposes a rolling
federal public trust doctrine that keeps pace with wildlife as it moves.6
clude other public trust assets, like the atmosphere, that by their nature are ad-
ministered by the polity for the benefit of the people and cannot be alienated to
private interests.”).
6. Here the author owes a debt to a student note proposing this modification for
conservation easements. See Note, Tristan Kimbrell, Moving Species and Non-
Moving Reserves: Conservation Banking and the Impact of Global Climate
Change, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 119 (2010) (proposing using the concept of
an “ark easement,” which would represent strategically placed reserves that
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To avoid placing huge swaths of the United States landmass under the
shadow of the public trust doctrine, the Article recommends that as
the trust moves to keep pace with migrating wildlife, land that is no
longer useful as habitat could be released.  This proposal would allow
formerly trust-protected lands to reenter the market place and tax
rolls unencumbered.  In this way, as new lands come within the doc-
trine’s reach, the release of other land could potentially achieve a
rough regional balance of trust-protected lands along various migra-
tory routes.
The Article develops these thoughts in Part II by describing the
impact of climate change generally and on wildlife, specifically. It also
introduces the reader to the importance and precariousness of migra-
tion corridors.  Part III explores deficiencies in both federal land and
wildlife laws and private land preservation mechanisms—like conser-
vation easements, land banks, and land trusts—in an era of climate
change.  In Part IV, the Article discusses both the public trust doctrine
and the federal government’s trust responsibilities over public lands
and resident wildlife, including when wildlife leaves those lands.  Part
V develops the three rationales supporting the existence of a federal
public trust doctrine identified above—the doctrine’s jurisdictional ca-
paciousness, parallelism in state and federal governance responsibili-
ties, and the Ninth Amendment.  Part V also introduces the idea that
courts might use the doctrine as a source of interpretative principles
to evaluate the legality of any barriers to wildlife migration and as a
basis for a hard look at these barriers.  Part VI introduces the reader
to suggested modifications of the doctrine to make it more politically
salient.  The Article concludes by suggesting that federal land manag-
ers and conservationists modestly use the federal public trust doctrine
to fill gaps in existing federal wildlife protection laws and to counter
deficiencies in private land preservation tools, and that courts use
public trust principles to evaluate disputes involving barriers to wild-
life migration.
II. THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
ON WILDLIFE
[W]hat happens to socioecological systems over the next decades, and
most likely over the next few centuries, will largely be beyond
human control.7
could be used as stepping stones for migrating species.  Once it was determined
that any such ark easement was no longer serving its ark purpose, it would be
extinguished and the proceeds would be redeployed to serve similar conservation
purposes on new lands).
7. Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five
Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 9, 14
(2010).
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A. General Impact of Climate Change
Nearly all climate scientists agree that human driven climate
change is happening.8  Many believe that “we have passed the point
where mitigation efforts alone can deal with the problems that climate
change is creating.”9  This is the result of a phenomenon called “com-
mitted warming”—a situation in which sufficient greenhouse gases
have already accumulated in the atmosphere ensuring that tempera-
ture increases and climate instability will continue regardless of any
global mitigation measures the world might take.10  Ongoing emis-
sions will only make matters worse by increasing the Earth’s energy
imbalance.11
Climate scientists are predicting temperatures in the United
States will increase as much as eleven degrees Fahrenheit by the end
of the current century.12  They also forecast that sea levels may rise
up to two meters by the same date.13  Although the Earth’s average
8. Id.; see also James L. Olmsted, The Butterfly Effect: Conservation Easements, Cli-
mate Change, and Invasive Species, 38 ENVTL. AFFAIRS 41, 43 (2011) (“Every day
about 6.9 billion of us, in ways small and large, collectively discharge prodigious
amounts of carbon and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.  The net re-
sult is global climate change.”).
9. Craig, supra note 7, at 14.
10. Id. See also Elizabeth Fuller Valentine, Arguments in Support of a Constitu-
tional Right to Atmospheric Integrity, 32 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 56, 60–61 (2015)
(“Direct measurements of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and air trapped in ice
reveal that carbon dioxide concentrations are forty percent higher today as com-
pared to levels prior to the industrial revolution.  The current atmospheric con-
centrations of carbon dioxide and two other greenhouse gases-methane and
nitrous oxide-are presently at levels unprecedented in the last 800,000 years.”);
id. at 61 (“Starting 800,000 years ago and continuing up until the start of the
twentieth century, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide were in the
range of 170 to 300 ppm.  Today, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide
have increased to nearly 400 ppm.  Research suggests that the last time that
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide approached 400 ppm was three to
five million years ago.”).
11. Valentine, supra note 10, at 65.
12. Nicholas Whipps, What Happens When Species Move but Reserves Do Not? Creat-
ing Climate Adaptive Solutions to Climate Change, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 559
(2015); see also Pamela S. Chasek, Rethinking the Law and Policy of Protected
Areas in a Warming World: Evolving Approaches of American Conservation Orga-
nizations, INT’L WILDLIFE & POL’Y J. 41, 49 (2012) (“The 2007 reports of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) conclude that human activity is
‘very likely’ causing the world to warm.  The average surface temperature of the
earth increased 0.76° C (1.4 F) in the 20th century and the prediction is that it
will increase by another 1.8 to 4.0 C (3.2 to 7.2° F) in the 21st century, depending
on pollution levels.”); Valentine, supra note 10, at 63 (“Researchers predict that
near-surface air temperature of the average location on Earth will also move be-
yond historical variability by 2047 (plus or minus 14 years) under a business as
usual scenario and by 2069 (plus or minus 18 years) under an emissions stabiliza-
tion scenario.”).
13. Olmsted, supra note 8, at 46.
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surface temperature has warmed only 0.8 degrees since the 1900s,14
the current rate at which temperatures are increasing is more than
ten times faster than previously and is projected to continue at a
faster, more intense rate than what is currently being experienced.15
“Tropical areas will be the first to experience historically unprece-
dented climate because of the[ir] relatively small natural climate vari-
ability,” with the result that by 2050, “most tropical regions will have
every subsequent month outside of their historical range of variabil-
ity.”16  Changes in the basic elements of ecological systems prompt
shifts and rearrangements of species, food webs, ecosystem functions,
and ecosystem services, complicating and even obliterating recogniza-
ble ecologies.17  The impact on temperatures is not uniform,18 making
any prediction about those impacts close to impossible.19  One thing
that seems more certain is that “many of these climate change-driven
ecological changes are likely to become both worse and more complex
in the coming decades . . . .”20
As land, air, and water temperatures rise, the amount and timing
of precipitation changes as do hydrology, soil conditions, and vegeta-
tion.  “We are moving along an at least somewhat unpredictable path
to an as yet unpredictable final destination . . . . Fundamental meta-
morphosis of the natural world, and of the ecosystem services upon
which human societies depend, is becoming our largely uncontrollable
reality.”21  Climate change is changing humanity’s sense of what is
“natural.”22
14. Valentine, supra note 10, at 61.
15. Id. (“More worrisome is the fact that the pace of climate change over the next
thirty to eighty years is projected to continue to be faster and more intense than
it presently is.”).
16. Id. at 63.
17. Craig, supra note 7, at 15.
18. Id. at 25.
19. Id.; see also id. at 26 (“Climate change impacts operate on complex ecosystems
and set in motion feedback loops and nonlinear changes, neither of which are
entirely (or even mostly) predictable through existing knowledge and modeling.”).
Professor Olmsted analogizes climate change to the butterfly effect, which
“stands for the proposition that certain outcomes are so sensitive to their initial
states that the resulting complexity defies human prediction.  Embedded in this
complexity is the operation of feedback loops, exponential increases and de-
creases in system components, and irreversible tipping points.  In this sense, the
butterfly effect is a powerful allegory of global climate change.”  Olmsted, supra
note 8, at 43.  Olmsted goes on to say “[l]ike Eckels’s single, unfortuitous boot
print, our collective carbon footprint is bringing disastrous, cascading, and inten-
sifying change to literally every part of our once Edenic planet.” Id. at 44.
20. Craig, supra note 7, at 25.
21. Id. at 37–38.
22. Id. at 38; see also Jedediah Purdy, Coming into the Anthropocene, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1619, 1637 (“The first and more straightforward is the Anthropocene Condi-
tion, the situation in which human action has changed every place, species, and
system of the natural world, from the upper atmosphere to the deep sea.  The
656 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:649
B. The Impact of Climate Change on Wildlife
Global climate change’s impact on wildlife may be even more
profound than the impact on people, if they are separable.  Sea levels
along the United States Coasts of the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mex-
ico are rising at a pace that exceeds the global average established
during the past fifty years.23  Human fortifications in response to ris-
ing seas are trapping and squeezing coastal species out of transitional
habitat between the land and the sea.24  The intensity of “high sever-
ity storms” in the Atlantic Ocean is escalating, “as are the frequency of
storm-generated large surge events and wave heights.”25  Storm
surges coupled with rising seas flood coastal wildlife habitats and
push water inland threatening those habitats as well.26
Increasing temperatures in the arctic are melting ice and eliminat-
ing critical hunting ground for polar bears.27  Warmer water tempera-
tures bleach coral and adversely affect cold-water fish species like
salmon and trout,28 which causes the collapse of critically important
ecosystems that sustain large populations of fish and other aquatic
species.29  Larger and more frequent floods increase soil erosion,
which decreases both water quality and the quality of aquatic
habitat.30  Severe droughts, which also appear to be increasing,31 kill
Anthropocene, in this sense, is the time in which there is no longer any such
thing as a ‘nature’ that is apart from and prior to human beings: all the world is a
joint product of human activity and underlying nonhuman phenomena, blended
in patterns from which the two can no longer be separated.”).
23. Lopez, supra note 2, at 158.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 160.
26. Id. at 160.
27. Chasek, supra note 12, at 50.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The extent to which droughts are actually increasing as a result of climate
change is a matter of some dispute in the scientific literature. See, e.g., John
Abraham, Global Warming Will Intensify Drought, Says New Study, GUARDIAN
(Dec. 23, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-
97-per-cent/2013/dec/23/global-warming-intensify-droughts [https://
perma.unl.edu/6AC8-57QM] (concluding that different measurement methodolo-
gies used by various studies make it hard to see trends, but that the consensus is
intensifying droughts); Aiguo Dai, Increasing Drought Under Global Warming in
Observations and Models, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 52 (2013) (Feb. 2013) (sug-
gesting severe drought conditions may occur in the eastern United States, south-
east Asia and Brazil as a result of climate change); Justin Sheffield, Eric F. Wood
& Michael L. Roderick, Little Change in Global Drought over the Past 60 Years,
491 NATURE 435 (Nov. 15, 2012); see also David Simeral, Droughts and Climate
Change, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS (Sept. 6, 2016), http://
www.c2es.org/science-impacts/extreme-weather/drought [https://perma.unl.edu/
VB76-BY98] (concluding “global warming will increase the risk of drought in
some regions, particularly in the Southwest United States”).
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plants that wildlife depend on for food and shelter and shrink water
sources.32  “Droughts caused by climate change  could also desiccate
up to ninety percent of central wetlands . . . that provide breeding,
resting, and nesting habitat for millions of waterfowl, shorebirds,
grassland birds, and other wildlife.”33  Climate change affects the
availability of food for migrating birds that arrive on schedule, only to
find the insects, seeds, and flowering plants on which they depend
“have hatched or bloomed too early or not at all.  Milder winters cause
seasonal food caches to spoil, so wildlife species that depend on food
stores to survive the winter are left without sustenance.”34  A recent
study of climate records from 1980 to 2010 that compared climate in-
formation with population trends of 145 common European bird spe-
cies and 380 common American bird species concluded that even small
changes in the abundance of common bird species, which dominate
ecosystems, “can lead to large changes in ecosystem structure, func-
tion, and service provision.”35
Excessive heat appears to be the cause of a 90% decline in the pop-
ulation of the northwestern Minnesota moose in the past twenty
years36 and the 36% die-off in the American Pika, a small rabbit-like
mammal that inhabits cold, wet boulder-strewn fields in the moun-
tains of the western United States, which has shifted its range up-
slope 900 feet in response to higher temperatures.37  “As different
species respond to changes in climate in idiosyncratic ways, ecological
communities will begin the process of disassembling.”38  Since there is
no historical precedent for this, there is considerable uncertainty
about how these communities may reassemble in new places, and
how, once reassembled, they might function, if at all.39
32. Chasek, supra note 12, at 50.
33. Id. at 50–51.
34. Id. at 50 (noting that the shift in the springtime abundance of insects has ad-
versely affected the reproductive success of songbirds that depend on this abun-
dance during their critical nesting phase).
35. Darryl Fears, Birds Are Swapping Habitats Like a Game of Musical Chairs As
Regions in Europe and the United States Warm, New Study Says, WASH. POST,
Apr. 1, 2016, at A3.
36. Chasek, supra note 12, at 50.
37. Id. See also, Donelle Schwalm, Clinton W. Epps, Thomas, Rodhouse, William B.
Monahan, Jessica A. Castillo, Chris Ray & Mackenie R. Jeffress, Habitat Availa-
bility and Gene Flow Influence Diverging Local Population Trajectories Under
Scenarios of Climate Change: A Place-Based Approach, 22 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOL-
OGY 1572 (2016) (examining different species distribution modeling for assessing
current and future impacts of climate change on species’ distributions).
38. Chasek, supra note 12, at 51; see also Fears, supra note 35, at A3 (“Various spe-
cies of birds flocking from one range to another leaves more than just a void. It
can do as much harm to a natural ecosystem as humans who abandon one city for
another can hurt the economy of their place of origin.”).
39. Chasek, supra note 12, at 51.
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Scientists estimate that 41% of all wild species have been affected
in some way by recent global climate change,40 and that many are
unlikely to survive as a result.41  Indeed, scientists “predict wide-
spread extinctions:  based on mid-range climate change scenarios,
15–37% of species will be extinct by 2050; 20–30% of species face an
increased risk of extinction with a 23 degrees Celsius rise, and
40–70% with a 3.5 degree rise . . . .”42  To adapt to the climate change
scenario projected for the next one hundred years, wild vertebrate spe-
cies will have to evolve at a rate 10,000 times faster than their histori-
cal rate of evolution.43  Bottom line, “[e]ach lost species signals the
permanent loss of millennia of information and future value.  In the
end, each lost species is a lost opportunity.”44
1. Wildlife Migration
A predicted effect of climate change will be the wholesale migra-
tions of entire species—and indeed entire biomes—as increases in av-
erage temperatures in their native climes send them northward, in
search of climates similar to those in which they evolved.  As an exam-
ple of this, the Baltimore Oriole, the eponymous mascot for the Orioles
baseball team, may no longer be found in the Washington region
thirty years from now.45  Literally thousands of species are moving an
average of about 17 kilometers per decade.46  The availability of suita-
ble habitat along the route for “climate surfing species” will determine
their survivability.47
40. Kimbrell, supra note 6, at 119.
41. Craig, supra note 7, at 69 (referencing the journal Nature and saying “[m]any
plant and animal species are unlikely to survive climate change.  New analyses
suggest that 15-37% of a sample of 1,103 land plants and animals would eventu-
ally become extinct as a result of climate changes expected by 2050.”). See also
id. at 51 (commenting that the “IPCC noted in 2007, one of the potential barriers
to climate change adaptation is ‘the inability of natural systems to adapt to the
rate and magnitude of climate change.’”).
42. Lopez, supra note 2, at 162 (“58% of plants and 35% of animals will lose more
than half of their current climatic range by the 2080s under the current green-
house-gas emissions scenario.”).
43. Id.
44. Whipps, supra note 12, at 587. See also id. at 564 (“There are currently more
than 20,000 threatened species worldwide, including 1517 populations listed as
being in danger of extinction in the United States alone.  Left unchecked, it is
clear that humans will continue habits that lead to species extinctions.  Markets
have traditionally ignored species loss as an externality to productive economic
activities, such as farming or foresting.”).
45. Fears, supra note 35, at A3.
46. Whipps, supra note 12, at 563; see also Kimbrell, supra note 6, at 119 (“Scientists
discovered that ninety-nine species of birds, butterflies, and alpine herbs, on av-
erage, were moving towards the poles by 3.8 miles a decade.”).
47. Olmsted, supra note 8, at 47 (“Such ‘climate surfing’ across isotherm lines will
determine the survival, or extinction, of the climate surfing species as they arrive
at stopping points along the way that may or may not be habitable.”).
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Wildlife may be unable to adapt quickly enough to rapid climate
change in their current habitats or move quickly enough to new, more
suitable areas as their current habitats change for the worse.48
Human impacts on the environment have undermined what adaptive
capacity species might otherwise have, and climate-driven ecological
changes “are already outstripping whatever adaptive capacity
remains.”49
Some wildlife will be unable to find new, suitable habitat,50 but
others will be unable to get to places where the climate is suitable
because of barriers along the way.  Most of the land migrating species
will encounter during their journey will have been “repurposed in
some way for human use.”51  These species may find themselves
caught between landscape changes caused by climate change, on one
side, and by human development, on the other.  Changing conditions
in protected areas may force wildlife using those areas away from the
protection they offer.  If one of these areas is encircled by land that
has been substantially modified or sealed off by a barrier like a fence
or a major road there may be no migratory route out.52  Many wild
species in this situation stand a high likelihood of going extinct.53
“For humans, a move of ten thousand miles would not necessarily
spell death; it would simply require that we practice another viable
way of life.  Other species do not have this same behavioral plastic-
ity.”54  And, while “humans have the capacity to mold a plot of land to
meet a wide variety of needs,” most non-human species lack that
capacity.55
By altering habitat as well as food and water availability and in-
creasing ecological disturbances, climate change not only forces wild-
life into migrating, but can also adversely affect the migrations
themselves.56  The longer the migration and the longer the time span
is during which the migration takes place, the greater the chance that
the land being traversed by migrating wildlife will be exposed to dif-
48. Chasek, supra note 12, at 51.
49. Craig, supra note 7, at 36–37.
50. Id. at 69. See also Whipps, supra note 12, at 563–64 (“Scientists count habitat
loss as one of ‘[t]he main causes of species extinction, and humans are the largest
source of habitat loss.’”).
51. Whipps, supra note 12, at 563.
52. Chasek, supra note 12, at 51.
53. Whipps, supra note 12, at 563.
54. Id. at 561.
55. Id.
56. Robert L. Fischman, Migration Conservation: A View from Above, 41 ENVTL. L.
277, 283 (2011); see also Thomas T. Moore, Climate Change and Animal Migra-
tion, 41 ENVTL. L. 393, 404 (2011) (“Since migratory species can cross thousands
of kilometers to complete migrations, a potential threat is that climate change
may alter habitat along the migration path in many different ways.”).
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ferent climate pressures.57  Indeed, climate change may “create novel
ecosystems” in new areas that might otherwise be suitable for climate
migrants, which might “cause migration corridors and destinations to
shift out of protected areas.”58
Additionally, there may be unintended negative consequences to
wildlife migrations on this geographic scale.  Thus, while migration to
new, more hospitable areas may save the migrating species, migrants
are an invasive species in their new habitat.  They may outcompete
and displace resident species, including endangered species.59  Non-
resident wildlife could over-browse vegetation decreasing the area’s
regenerative capacity and productivity, adversely affecting a wide
range of species, especially if migrations shift species into new, more
environmentally sensitive areas.60  Migrants can also function as dis-
ease vectors bringing new diseases from distant areas, which can in-
fect wildlife already stressed by climate change.61
Wildlife migrations can involve long, cross-continental journeys or
comparatively short trips of a few hundred meters.62  Except in the
case of very short migrations, local land use planning operates at the
wrong scale to respond to the size and length of climate-driven migra-
tions scientists expect.63  The predicted long distances and multiple
jurisdictions traversed by migrating species in response to climate
change make it difficult to protect not only the migrating species, but
57. Moore, supra note 56, at 404 (“The strength of this effect will vary depending on
the scale of migration, so this will especially be a threat for long-distance mi-
grants, as the chance of exposure to differing climate pressures increases as
travel distance increases.”).
58. Id. at 405.  Moore recommends that there should be more protected migration
corridors as that will create “more options” for migrating wildlife to adapt to a
changing climate. Id.
59. Kimbrell, supra note 6, at 135.
60. Moore, supra note 56, at 400; see also id. at 398–400 (“A shift in a migration
corridor could potentially disperse novel seed types, alter species composition,
and introduce invasive species.”); Olmsted, supra note 8, at 44 (noting the success
of humans as an invasive species, and saying: “As we try to feed and house nearly
6.9 billion people, with a projected increase to 9.1 billion by 2050, all of humanity
has become an invasive species—and a very successful one at that.  We no longer
have any natural enemies; we are extraordinarily adaptable and able to thrive
under almost any environmental conditions.”).
61. Moore, supra note 56, at 399 (“[M]igrants themselves may also cause distur-
bances to other species and ecosystems as a vector bringing disease from distant
locations.  The spread of the West Nile virus in the Eastern United States and
Lyme disease have been attributed to migrating birds.  Climate change may in-
crease susceptibility of local species to disease brought by migrants by creating
conditions less hostile to new pathogens.”).
62. Id. at 394; see David N. Cherney, Securing the Free Movement of Wildlife: Lessons
from the American West’s Longest Land Mammal Migration, 41 ENVTL. L. 599,
601 (2011) (“[M]igrations are most easily conceived of as the seasonal movement
of animals between two distinct habitats.”).
63. Craig, supra note 7, at 57.
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also all the stopover, breeding, and winter areas that are traversed.64
Because of their length, migratory corridors of necessity involve “more
dispersed parties with fewer shared interests” making it unlikely that
the population status of migrating wildlife will be of much, if any, in-
terest to the landowners or local political jurisdictions that wildlife
crosses or flies over.65
2. Assisted Migration and Protecting Migratory Corridors
To enable species to move when they lose the use of their current
habitat, areas beyond their current ranges may need to be protected.66
Doing this will help species retreat on their own from inhospitable ar-
eas.67  However, this Article does not suggest, as others do,68 that peo-
ple should assist in the migration of wildlife69 through the managed
relocation of species.70
Assisted migration is a much debated adaption strategy that this
Article sees no need to consider as a solution.71  It raises ethical and
liability questions and difficult choices for wildlife management agen-
64. Moore, supra note 56, at 404.
65. Steven L. Yaffee, Collaborative Strategies for Managing Animal Migrations: In-
sights from The History of Ecosystem-Based Management, 41 ENVTL. L. 655, 672
(2011); see also id. at 660–61 (“While traditional land management might have
focused on the place-based needs of a population, [in this era of climate driven
migration,] migration management must expand management boundaries to in-
clude pathways and far-flung places of importance to a species.”).
66. Lopez, supra note 2, at 170–71; see also Pola Lem, Climate Change Creates Win-
ners and Losers Among Birds, CLIMATEWIRE (April 1, 2016), http://
www.eeners.net/climatewiree/stories/1060034932 [https://perma.unl.edu/SC5A-
WH6G] (“If science suggests that many species mover farther north . . . that this
tells conservationists to allocate more land toward the northern end of species
ranges rather than the southern end.”).
67. Lopez, supra note 2, at 171.
68. See Purdy, supra note 22, at 1634 (referring to the “rise of a new strain of what
one could call pro-mastery environmentalism, which embraces technology such as
carbon capture and geoengineering and is enthusiastic about the human role in
shaping the world.  The claim of this school of thought is that human impact on
the planet is so vast and irreversible that people must give up misgivings about
their world-shaping power if they are to use it well.”).
69. One federal law that engages in assisted wildlife is the Endangered Species Act
(ESA).  Lopez, supra note 2, at 159 (“ . . . through the ESA, the Service has the
responsibility to consider utilizing assisted migration, manifested as active or
passive aid-through its authority to implement recovery plans, create experimen-
tal populations, and designate unoccupied critical habitat-to help imperiled spe-
cies survive a rapidly changing environment.”).  For a list of articles supporting
or opposing assisted migration, see supra note 4.
70. Lopez, supra note 2, at 159 (saying “[m]anaged relocation,” which is a form of
active assisted migration, is “the intentional act of moving species, populations,
or genotypes (the target) to a location outside a target’s known historical distribu-
tion for the purpose of maintaining biological diversity or ecosystem functioning
as an adaptation strategy for climate change”).
71. Craig, supra note 7, at 52.
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cies about which species to assist.72  Assisted migration also requires
significant management planning, likely ongoing monitoring and
management of the populations that have been moved73 and will re-
sult in lost opportunity costs.74  There is a significant ecological risk in
moving species to a new area, and no evidence that any translocated
species will have the time or capacity to adjust to the new ecosystems
they have been moved to before climate change adversely affects
them.75  Additional management problems are also created because it
is “unlikely that any natural migratory behavior scrambled by the ef-
fects of climate change could be manipulated by humans to achieve
anything near an orderly and linear migration.”76
However, passive assisted migration, such as protecting existing
migratory corridors and habitat reserves or creating new ones, might
help species avoid the full effects of climate change.77  Designed prop-
erly, migratory corridors facilitate connectivity between protected ar-
eas.  They “offer a way to accommodate the natural, albeit climate
change induced, migration of species and even entire ecosystems”78 to
new, more suitable habitat.  As animals migrate across boundaries,
“retaining and enhancing connectivity among habitats used by mi-
grating animals” becomes critically important.79  Migratory connectiv-
ity links breeding sites, migration routes, and wintering areas of
importance to individual members of a species or an entire
population.80
72. Lopez, supra note 2, at 159.
73. Id. at 189.
74. Id. at 190.
75. Id.; see also Craig, supra note 7, at 53 (referring to her own article and saying
“this Article consciously adopts an attitude of humility in the face of ecological
responses to climate change and assumes that, given enough room and enough
options, Nature will generally do a better job of adapting ecosystems to new base-
line conditions than humans will”).
76. Olmsted, supra note 8, at 71 (“[C]limate change-induced species migrations can
be expected to be disorderly and unsynchronized.”).
77. Lopez, supra note 2, at 1562–63; see also Chasek, supra note 12, at 52 (“One way
to facilitate the adaptation of ecosystems to climate change, and a tool now being
built into protected area systems plans, is the designation of biological
corridors.”).
78. Chasek, supra note 12, at 52.
79. Robert L. Fischman & Jeffrey B. Hyman, The Legal Challenge of Protecting
Animal Migrations as Phenomena of Abundance, 28 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 211 (2010)
(“Migrating animals are often the vehicles connecting dispersed habitat, transfer-
ring nutrients, energy, and other biological resources.”); see also id. at 278 (“Con-
nectivity linking breeding sites, travel paths, wintering areas, and key sources of
food across landscapes is . . . critical for effective adaptation to climate change,
which will spur species to disperse into new regions.  In that respect, successful
efforts to maintain animal migrations may create templates for improving ecolog-
ical resilience as climate change accelerates.”).
80. Fischman, supra note 56, at 282; see also Fischman & Hyman, supra note 79, at
211 (mentioning a recent U.S. government report that discussed how the national
2017] PROTECTING MIGRATING WILDLIFE 663
A side benefit of focusing on migratory connectivity between differ-
ent regions of the country, or even countries, is fostering socioeco-
nomic connections between these disparate areas.  These human
connections can lead to “a more reliable foundation for effective and
sustainable conservation efforts to protect migratory species.”81  So-
cioeconomic connectivity can also encourage political commitment to
support long-term conservation initiatives like those involved in main-
taining long-distance migratory corridors82—a potential antidote to
the anomie that might otherwise afflict the incongruent interests of
landowners along the route.83  The idea of social connectivity is rele-
vant to federal agencies as well, given that most federal reserves are
surrounded by private lands, the boundaries of which are frequently
crossed by the species they harbor.84
“Whether or not corridors will be an element of successful adapta-
tions to climate change will depend, of course, on a variety of factors,
including the scale of the landscapes over which they are deployed, the
location, size, and habitat composition of specific corridors, and the
actual behaviors of the targeted species”85 not to mention integrated
and continuous political and private support by affected jurisdictions,
as noted above.  Lack of baseline information about various species,
like their habitat needs, behaviors, and natural migration cycles, cre-
ate challenges with respect to identifying migration corridors in nor-
mal times, but these are not normal times.  While migration corridors
are nothing new and have long been promoted as a way to reconnect
wildlife refuge system can adapt to climate change by establishing “corridors of
connectivity for migrations”).
81. Peter P. Marra, David Hunter, & Anne M. Perrault, Migratory Connectivity and
the Conservation of Migratory Animals, 41 ENVTL. L. 317, 318–19 (2011); see id.
at 348 (“[M]igratory connectivity can strengthen the ‘social connectivity’ between
distant communities—the web of social, cultural, institutional and economic rela-
tions that can connect distant locations and allow for the successful pursuit of
shared conservation goals.”); see also Robert L. Fischman, Leveraging Federal
Land Use Plans into Landscape Conservation, 6 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL.
L. 46, 51 (2016) (suggesting that unit-level federal management plans should con-
sider both “the ecological and socio-economic connections that tie them together”).
82. Marra et al., supra note 81, at 348 (“Organizing around focused, shared conserva-
tion goals at the community level can build the political will for national or inter-
national conservation efforts, even where national interests might not allow for
such cooperation.”).
83. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
84. Fischman, supra note 81, at 47 (“[S]ocial systems operating around land reserves
play an important role in the ability of individual units to achieve their goals.
Ecosystem-based management requires collaborations that build strength
through trust across jurisdictional boundaries.”).
85. Chasek, supra note 12, at 53.
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fragmented landscapes,86 what is new is that the corridors themselves
may need to migrate,87 contributing to the challenge.
In an era of shrinking public funds, acquisition of land in a migra-
tory corridor seems unlikely.  Even if there is money, it may be hard to
rally public support for spending it on protecting migratory species
when those expenditures “are aimed at avoiding an uncertain but
feared outcome rather than solving an immediate problem,”88 of which
there are many.  Alternatively, the imposition of stringent controls on
activities in migratory corridors89 may alienate and anger private
landowners and local officials,90 which relates to this Article’s propo-
sal to use the public trust doctrine to preserve open migratory routes.
Regardless of the challenges, if wildlife are to survive the effects of
climate change, then safe passage from areas that are no longer habit-
able must be secured.  Accordingly, the next part of this Article turns
to whether federal habitat protection laws or private land mechanisms
can preserve land in migratory corridors for future occupation by
wildlife.
III. RIGID FEDERAL LAWS AND INADEQUATE PRIVATE
CONSERVATION MECHANISMS
Climate change impacts are metamorphic and transformative.91
Habitat loss and barriers to migration that impede the movement
of wildlife mean that simply conserving migratory species will not pre-
serve actual migrations.92  “[D]evelopment in the matrix surrounding
public lands may block ecological processes and animal movements
from one land unit to another.  Climate change, in particular, raises
the stakes for maintaining and restoring connectivity in order to pro-
mote resilience.”93  To assure the survival of climate migrants, new
habitats and corridors connecting those areas need to be protected.
However, much of the land required for this effort is in private hands.
This creates a problem because the scope of federal laws protecting
public lands and wildlife is too limited to safeguard most climate mi-
86. Fischman & Hyman, supra note 79, at 213.
87. Id. at 214 (suggesting rolling easements for coastal habitat as sea levels rise as a
useful template).
88. Yaffee, supra note 65, at 673.
89. Fischman & Hyman, supra note 79, at 213.
90. Fischman, supra note 81, at 52 (“Planning to act beyond federal land borders is
controversial, particularly where neighbors resent the federal presence in the
area.”).
91. Craig, supra note 7, at 30.
92. Fischman, supra note 56, at 278.
93. Fischman, supra note 81, at 51.
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grants on private lands.94  Private land conservation mechanisms
similarly fall short in this regard.
A. Federal Lands and Federal Laws
While some species are able to adapt to changing conditions,95
wildlife laws in the United States are not so adaptable.96  The stress
placed on natural systems by climate change is also stressing the re-
sponsive capacity of existing federal laws.  The place- and species-
based focus of these laws make it difficult to stretch their words to
cover the changing environment, and the current dystopian political
environment has made them almost impossible to modify.
Current federal public lands laws protect only lands that have
been withdrawn by Congress generally for a specific purpose, like a
national wildlife refuge or forest, and function only within their rigid
geographic boundaries regardless of changing circumstances that may
make the land within those boundaries less useful for their designated
purpose.97  The Endangered Species Act (ESA), which protects habitat
that is critical to the survival of listed protected species,98 is not suffi-
ciently flexible to protect additional land as the original land becomes
less critical for the species’ survival.  Habitat Conservation Plans
(HCPs), which are a perquisite to getting a permit to incidentally take
an endangered species under section 10 of the ESA,99 contain no as-
surances that new land will be protected once important habitat for
94. Id. at 47 (“Providing corridors for migration, or even more active translocations,
generally necessitates planning over a span of elevations and latitudes that any
single federal land unit seldom fully encompasses.”).
95. See Atwell et al., supra note 3, at 309 (saying, with respect to juncos, an observed
instability in sex ratio between years suggests plasticity in junco migratory be-
havior and a possible adaptation to changing climate).
96. As examples of perhaps misplaced adaptability, Holly Doremus describes the va-
rious initiatives of the Babbitt Interior Department to lessen the controversiality
of the ESA, such as “candidate conservation agreements,” no-surprises policy,
and special rules issued under section 4(d) to lessen protections accorded to
threatened species. See Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered
Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protec-
tion, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 60–61 (2001)
97. Jamison Colburn, Habitat Reserve Problem-Solving: Desperately Seeking In-
termediaries, 41 ENVTL. L. 619, 629 (2011) (“The major federal public lands sys-
tems and the statutes governing them have been shaped to fit other priorities,
and the potential connectivity between public lands as habitat is, as a rule, very
low.”). But see Joseph L. Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and the Regu-
lation of Private Land, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239, 250–58 (1976) (arguing that the
Property and Commerce Clauses gave the agencies constitutional authority to
reach beyond their boundaries to regulate private lands).
98. 16 U.S.C. § 4(a)(3)(A)(i) (2012).  Both the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture
have the authority to acquire lands to conserve fish, wildlife, and plants, includ-
ing, but not limited to listed endangered or threatened species.  12 U.S.C. § 5.
99. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 10(a)(2), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(a)(2) (2012).
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those species no longer serve their mitigation purposes.  In a world of
global climate change, it is entirely conceivable that land set aside as
wildlife habitat in a section 10 HCP or as a national wildlife refuge
could by mid-century no longer have any wildlife, let alone any suita-
ble habitat.
Climate change will affect all our major public lands systems, in-
cluding those with high value wildlife habitat.  For example, sea level
rise is expected to adversely affect 173 national wildlife refuges, suffi-
ciently altering habitat in coastal refuges to separate wildlife from key
habitats.100  The U.S. Geological Survey is predicting that some of the
biggest glaciers in Glacier National Park may be gone by 2030 and
with them the species that are dependent on them.101  Climate change
may exacerbate existing stressors like wildfires, droughts, and inva-
sive species on Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands, causing
changes in management practices, for example forcing BLM to curtail
livestock grazing to protect plants and wildlife stressed by drought.102
Yet as bad as these projected physical impacts of climate change are,
the combination of the high level of uncertainty from the confounding
and poorly understood variables involved in climate change and “the
limited adaptive capacity of existing natural resource laws and man-
agement institutions” is even more worrisome.103
Additionally problematic, most natural resources laws incorporate
a preservation and restoration paradigm that is fundamentally at
odds with the dynamic, unstable world we find ourselves in.104  The
laws governing national parks and wilderness areas, according to Ca-
macho and Glicksman, are “rooted in historical and wildness preser-
vation goals that impair agencies’ ability to meet climate-related
threats.”105  Craig finds examples of the restoration paradigm in the
goals of the ESA and in the requirements of section 404 of the Clean
Water Act (CWA), and of the preservation paradigm in the movement
towards an ecosystem management approach by public land managers
to preserve ecosystem functions and services.106  But, this new cli-
100. Alejandro E. Camacho and Robert L. Glicksman, Legal Adaptive Capacity: How
Program Goals and Processes Shape Federal Land Adaptation to Climate Change
87 U. COLO. L. Rev. 711, 740.  In addition, “[p]erhaps the starkest quandary fac-
ing an agency subject to those constraints will be choosing between translocating
endangered species to lands upon which they have never previously existed or
presiding over species extinction.”). Id. at 823.
101. Id. at 740.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 741.
104. Craig, supra note 7, at 37 (“[A]lthough the dynamism/stationarity problem has
been recognized, the law has not changed significantly to acknowledge it.”).
105. Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 100, at 816.
106. Craig, supra note 7, at 34. See also Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 100, at
720 (urging “changes in the substantive standards that govern federal land man-
agement to enhance legal adaptive capacity by placing greater emphasis on pro-
2017] PROTECTING MIGRATING WILDLIFE 667
mate-driven world makes illusory the goal of returning to and then
preserving any particular “historical ecological state of being,”107 es-
pecially as climate change modifies baseline conditions.108  To what
exactly would the world be returning?  Assumptions underlying both
the preservation and restoration norms about the stability of natural
systems have long been replaced by norms of instability.109  According
to Craig,
climate change-driven ecological transformations will almost certainly out-
pace natural dynamism in several respects—faster and greater accumulation
of greenhouse gases than has ever occurred before; faster melting of polar ice
and glaciers; more rapidly increasing air and water temperatures; abruptly
changing air and ocean currents—with results that will be more dramatic and
visible than “normal” ecosystem dynamics.110
Moreover, these paradigms erroneously assume the predictability and
reversibility of human-caused ecological change regardless of the rea-
sons for those changes.111
The impacts of climate change are way beyond what little adaptive
capacity federal natural resources laws have.  Camacho and
Glicksman talk about the need to have “a legal system characterized
by significant substantive legal adaptive capacity” that may function
better when circumstances are unanticipated or changing.112  Yet, a
“fundamental re-envisioning”113 of environmental and natural re-
sources law seems unlikely because of the rigidity of the laws them-
moting ecological function on lands governed by the multiple-use mandate, and
by detaching management goals from strict adherence to historical or wildness
preservation where climate change is likely to render those goals ineffective at
promoting ecological health”).
107. Craig, supra note 7, at 34 (“Like the restoration paradigm, the preservation para-
digm incorporates an expectation that ecosystems are or should be stable and
that managers can sustain one particular historical ecological state of being.”).
108. Id. at 35 (“Preserving natural resources implies an attempt to keep them in a
particular state of being—another losing proposition as baseline conditions shift
in response to climate change.”).
109. Hope M. Babcock, Chumming on the Chesapeake Bay and Complexity Theory:
Why the Precautionary Principle, Not Cost-Benefit Analysis, Makes More Sense as
a Regulatory Approach, 82 WASH. L. REV. 505, 526–29 (discussing how the
bioeconomic model of the natural world has been replaced by principles of non-
linearity and complexity).
110. Craig, supra note 7, at 36.
111. Id. 35.
112. Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 100, at 736 (“A regime that lacks such capac-
ity is likely to sacrifice the potential to tailor decisions to changing conditions in
ways that promote regulatory or management goals.  Thus, a substantively adap-
tive system can reduce the risk that the quest for consistency leads to the applica-
tion of fixed and bright-line rules to factual contexts for which they were not
designed or are otherwise ill-matched.”).
113. Craig, supra note 7, at 30 (“Environmental and natural resources law in a climate
change adaptation era require fundamental re-visioning, because both regulatory
goals and the legal mechanisms for accomplishing them will have to be centered
on the concept of change itself.”).
668 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:649
selves, constraining all but the most modest of expansions, and the
low probability that Congress will enact new laws or even amend old
ones in the current political environment.114
Even if federal natural resources laws were not so maladapted to
the circumstances of climate change, the lands themselves offer too
little acreage to safely house climate migrants—public land comprise
only 28%, or 635–640 million acres, of the United States land base.115
The management regimes covering some of these lands reflect non-
wildlife friendly priorities,116 like production of food and fiber, extrac-
tion of mineral resources, and the harvest of high value commercial
timber.  There are major jurisdictional gaps between agencies and be-
tween political divisions and taxonomical gaps between species, de-
pending on their protected status,117 making the construction of a
geographically continuous, uninterrupted migratory corridor difficult.
While the ESA’s programs to protect critical habitat and require
habitat conservation plans apply to private lands, they are only trig-
gered by the presence of listed species, which are a very small subset
of the species that global climate change will affect.118
Federal lands do not offer a solution to the protection of migrating
wildlife—the available land base is too small and is managed under
laws with different goals.  Federal natural resources laws, designed
for another era when restoration and preservation were the dominant
management goals and whose geographic boundaries are fixed by
114. Todd S. Aagaard, Using Non-Environmental Law to Accomplish Environmental
Objectives, 30 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 35 (2014) (“The current prolonged period
of congressional impasse on environmental issues, in which symbolic ideological
skirmishes have largely supplanted constructive engagement, makes clear that
Congress is unlikely to generate progress on environmental issues any time
soon.”).
115. The four largest landholders are United States Forest Service (USFS) in the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA), which manages nearly 193 million acres, the
National Park Service (NPS), which manages approximately 80 million acres, the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages nearly 248 million acres of
land, and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), which manages approximately 89
million acres of land.  Additionally, Congress has designated 109 million acres
federal lands wilderness under the Wilderness Act of 1964. See Camacho &
Glicksman, supra note 100, at 714–15.
116. Colburn, supra note 97, at 629.
117. Fischman, supra note 56, at 283–34 (comparing marine mammals, which are
comprehensively managed, and bats, which are not).
118. Fischman & Hyman, supra note 79, at 218 (“The ESA illustrates that some regu-
latory restrictions may spur habitat conservation planning that can secure
habitat.  Programs for endangered species protection offer landowners a range of
inducements, but most comprehensive efforts to protect habitat on private lands
begin with a prohibition or restriction that brings private landowners to the nego-
tiating table.  It may be necessary for the federal government to prod states and
local governments to implement some restrictions as sticks to balance a program
of carrots for securing habitat.”).
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law,119 are ill-suited to the new problems and needs of a climate
changing world.  Indeed, if left unchanged, as is likely, federal natural
resource law will increasingly become irrelevant.
B. Inadequate Private Conservation Mechanisms
Nearly 70% of the land in the United States is privately owned—in
some states that number increases to 90%120—and 80% of the species
listed under the ESA use private land to some extent.121  So if wildlife
are to be protected when their migratory routes take them across and
onto private lands and federal laws, for the most part,122 do not reach
private property, then private property mechanisms, like conservation
easements, land trusts, and conservation land banks, might play a
useful role in preserving land for climate migrants.123  Unfortunately,
the problems with these devices make them less useful for that pur-
pose than one might hope.
Conservation easements are “non-possessory rights in land that
have environmental purposes.”124  They are a form of servitude that is
intended to burden land in perpetuity.125  Indeed, perpetual protec-
tion is “the cornerstone of conservation easements.”126  Conservation
easements usually contain restrictions on how land may be used and
are often held by land trusts when they are associated with compensa-
tory mitigation under section 404 of the CWA or section 10 of the
ESA.127  One of the pluses of conservation easements is that they are
self-perpetuating, requiring no outside management interference and
related administrative costs.128
119. Sax comments that these boundaries were often “drawn according to no discerni-
ble principle (except for the obvious expedient of response to contending political
forces), and thus some lands outside park boundaries seem at least as needful of
federal regulation as many private inholdings.”  Sax, supra note 97, at 264.
120. Whipps, supra note 12, at 565.
121. Id. at 565–66.
122. The exceptions to this statement are the ESA which contains provisions (Sections
4, 7, 9, and 10) that can affect and protect private lands, and section 404 of the
Clean Water Act which protects wetland habitat.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1536, 1538,
1539 (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1) (2012).
123. One form of environmental governance not examined in this Article is private
contracting to manage landscape level resources.  For those interested in that
topic, see Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck, Contracting for Control of
Landscape-Level Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507 (2015) (examining private
contracting in the areas of wildfire, wildlife fisheries, underground resources, and
scenic landscapes).
124. Jessica Owley, The Increasing Privatization of Environmental Permitting, 46 AK-
RON L. REV. 1091, 1114 (2013).
125. Id.
126. Jessica Owley, Conservation Easements at the Climate Change Crossroads, 74
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199 (2011).
127. Owley, supra note 124, at 1113–14
128. Owley, supra note 126, at 201.
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But projected landscape alterations from climate change pose seri-
ous problems for conservation easements, as they do for any property
device that tries to preserve current land in perpetuity.  Conservation
easements can only ensure that the easement holder does not ad-
versely affect the protected land, like drain a wetland, but cannot oth-
erwise guarantee that the land will retain the values for which it was
protected.129  The effects of climate change on a specific plot of land
covered by a conservation easement may create conflicts with that
easement’s purpose, if it is to protect habitat for certain wildlife spe-
cies that are no longer there because climate change has made the
habitat unsuitable, or with easement restrictions that prevent the in-
troduction of new species which might be climate migrants fleeing the
effect of climate change.130  Since the essence of climate change is
changed circumstance, the doctrine of “changed circumstances,” which
allows courts to terminate conservation easements when circum-
stances change,131 could lead to court-ordered termination of conser-
vation easements almost at will, in situations where easements no
longer protect land with any habitat value, undercutting any value
the easement might otherwise have in protecting land for the long
term.  Climate change illustrates the absurdity of using a form of land
protection, like conservation easements or for that matter federal land
withdrawals, that is geared to be protect static “ ‘vignettes’ of nature,”
when climate change can “rearrange[ ] nature on every level, from the
smallest micro fauna and micro flora to entire continents such as
Greenland.”132
Land trusts and conservation banks fare no better for many of the
same reasons.  There are more than 1,600 local land trusts across the
country,133 which administer conservation easements and other inter-
ests in land, and nearly that many conservation banks,134 allowing
129. Owley, supra note 124, at 1115 n. 168.
130. Owley, supra note 126, at 205–08.
131. Kimbrell, supra note 6, at 127.
132. Olmsted, supra note 8, at 56; see also Whipps, supra note 12, at 575 (“The Shaw
study found that ‘[e]stablishing a static network of connected reserves through
acquisition or set-asides may not be effective in the future given ecological, eco-
nomic, and social responses to climate change are likely to be nonlinear and
multidirectional.’”).
133. Jamison Colburn, Habitat Restoration Problem Solving: Desperately Seeking So-
phisticated Intermediaries, 41 ENVTL. L. 619, 634 (2011) (“Land trusts are non-
profit land conservation organizations,” which often play a “role in overseeing
conservation easements preservation compensatory mitigation lands.”); see also
Owley, supra note 124, at 1107.  These conservation easements are entered into
between landowners and land trusts “with minimal or absent government in-
volvement and oversight.” Id. at 1107.
134. As of January 2010, there were over 950 wetland and stream mitigation banks
covering in excess of 960,000 acres.  Owley, supra note 124, at 1108–09.  As of
January 2009, the FWS had approved over ninety conservation banks, covering
over 9000 acres of wildlife habitat. Id.  Mitigation banks “enable[ ] the conver-
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the transfer of habitat credits to enable some form of development.135
When a landowner conserves habitat for a species, the landowner can
“market” the protected habitat as credits for other landowners who
need to compensate for developing land elsewhere.136  But, a fee sim-
ple reserve system, like what exists under a land trust or a conserva-
tion bank, makes little sense given the high likelihood that climate
change may prompt protected wildlife to move to a new area not part
of the original land trust or bank137—the same problem that plagues
conservation easements.  Additionally, tax and property law create “a
set of incentives that make large scale conservation difficult to coordi-
nate in a decentralized fashion.”138  This heightens the possibility
that existing “ecological fragmentation” may be made worse by the
“haphazard acquisition of conservation easements” by conservation
banks.139  “[E]ven the most impressive conservation acquisitions are
always separated by still more unprotected land that is fragmented in
ownership.”140
Thus, a conservation banking system, like land trusts or lands pro-
tected by conservation easements, may even in the best of circum-
stance—and these are not the best—create ecological islands of
remnant populations that may be unable to rejoin or move with larger
populations of their species.141  Once a transaction setting up a con-
servation bank is completed, it cannot be undone or redone, and the
value of credits cannot be reset.  So if land in a conservation bank be-
comes less valuable for wildlife due to climate change or management
strategies change, no changes can be made in the bank’s terms nor can
sion of thousands of acres of wetlands and endangered species habitats, facilitat-
ing development of those lands.” Id. at 1110.
135. There are at least two types of conservation banks—mitigation banks which pro-
vide for replacement of lost wetland values prior to their destruction and habitat
conservation banks which protect habitat for listed and threatened endangered
species. Id. at 1108.
136. Kimbrell, supra note 6, at 125.  Although the FWS, which oversees conservation
banks under the ESA, requires that conservation banks have a sufficiently capi-
talized endowment to assure that the management plan for the bank can con-
tinue in perpetuity, id. at 125–26, this requirement may be of little help when the
land covered by the endowment are no longer useful.
137. Whipps, supra note 12, at 562.  Colburn also complains that the activities of land
trusts are shrouded in secrecy and under the scrutiny of the IRS, which inhibits
any creativity that might otherwise be possible.  Colburn, supra note 97, at 640
(“[T]he more [the] IRS invests in monitoring and enforcing its rules on ‘qualified’
conservation contributions, the more it chills the very sort of experimentation
and problem solving we need most.”); id. at 641 (“Because of their complexity, the
tax code and IRS regulations cast a shadow over innovations in conservation
dealmaking.”).
138. Fischman, supra note 56, at 285.
139. Id.
140. Colburn, supra note 97, at 637.
141. Whipps, supra note 12, at 575.
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a holder of bank credits be required to purchase any additional cred-
its.142  While the rigidity in credit values assures predictable credit
prices, making investment in the bank less risky for bankers and
credit holders,143 “[t]his resistance to change may not adequately con-
serve climate-sensitive species”144 when the value of credits covering
existing habitat plunges because the species has moved on.145
In an era of climate change, wildlife habitat may well be irreversi-
bly modified in the next century, even half century, “let alone in the
duration imagined by the artificial concept of ownership in
perpetuity.”146  In this world,
conservation banks would externalize all conservation costs that must occur
outside of the bank’s boundaries when bank species move off bank habitat.
Every acre of bank land originally intended for perpetual conservation that
can no longer be used by the species is bank value lost.  Every new acre en-
listed outside of the bank that must add protective measures for listed species
due to species movement is a cost for which the conservation banking system
does not account.147
Requiring conservation banks to follow “species that are dispersing in
several directions,” in unpredictable and uncertain ways, may quickly
make conservation banks prohibitively expensive for bankers.148
There are also privacy concerns that lead many landowners to re-
sist participating in any form of land preservation system like a con-
servation bank or land trust, if it requires, as most do, regular
inspections to see if the land is being properly preserved.149  These
concerns make these systems less attractive to private landholders as
ways to protect habitat for climate migrants.  Conservation banks also
rely heavily on private actors to carry out what are actually “public
142. Id. at 573. But see Kimbrell, supra note 6, at 147–48 (proposing a “stepping
stone” approach, which would require that if a listed species goes locally extinct
in a conservation bank, the conservation bank owner must buy land where the
species currently exists and must either create a conservation easement for those
new lands, or buy credits for that species in another conservation bank where the
species currently exists).
143. Whipps, supra note 12, at 573.
144. Id. at 573; see also id. at 573–74 (noting the reason for this rigidity is to establish
predictable credit prices, giving both land bankers and permittees sufficient se-
curity to make the investment).
145. Kimbrell, supra note 6, at 120 (“However, if the species migrates away from the
conservation bank land due to climate change or some other ecological interac-
tion, then developers are developing land but the species is not being protected in
the long-term.”).  For criticisms of conservation banks, see id. at 129–30 (discuss-
ing the problem of double-dipping by improperly stacking banks and unantici-
pated ecological interactions among populations of protected species).
146. Whipps, supra note 12, at 574.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 586.
149. Id. at 585 (describing landowner concerns lest violations of federal laws protect-
ing species be discovered and general resistance to the idea of having strangers
on one’s land).
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permitting programs,” raising serious accountability, oversight, and
enforcement concerns.150  These private actors also have significant
control over how land in a bank is managed and what land is actually
protected.151  There are no laws, regulations, or agency guidance gov-
erning the management of land trusts or conservation banks, nothing
requiring expertise or experience, let alone monitoring of perform-
ance.152  Private actors are more likely to be motivated by the desire
to run a profitable business and “may be more focused on things like
maximizing profits, making donors happy, and maintaining amiable
relations with neighbors,”153 none of which has anything to do with
maintaining the conservation values of the protected land.
This Part of the Article has revealed the shortcomings of federal
lands and the laws protecting them as well as of private land conser-
vation tools that might otherwise protect wildlife species as they mi-
grate across private land to avoid the effects of climate change.  The
next Part of the Article discusses whether the common law public
trust doctrine might perform any better.
IV. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND A FEDERAL TRUST
IN WILDLIFE
The public trust doctrine is rooted in the precept that some resources
are so central to the well-being of the community that they must be
protected by distinctive, judge-made principles.  This is an accepted
process in our law: Anglo-American jurisprudence is rife with
judicially developed doctrines that reflect the deeply
held convictions of our society.154
Given the speed with which the natural environment is transform-
ing itself in response to climate change, the sooner legal regimes can
adapt to this new “world of triage, best guesses, and shifting sands,”
the better.155  We need new approaches about how to think about nat-
ural resources law and a “new legal framework that will allow a multi-
plicity of techniques to be brought to bear in crafting adaptation
responses to particular local impacts while still promoting actions con-
sistent with overall ecological and social goals.”156  The public trust
150. Owley, The Increasing Privatization, supra note 124, at 1112; see id. at 1125 (dis-
cussing the “high rate of noncompliance” with mitigation bank mitigation plans
and limited long-term monitoring of mitigation projects).
151. Id. at 1113.
152. Id. at 1124.
153. Id. at 1121.
154. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 315.
155. Craig, supra note 7, at 16.
156. Id. at 16–17; see also Aagaard, supra note 114, at 37 (discussing Professor Donald
Elliott’s solution to the legislative logjam calling for “portage strategies . . . law-
making techniques for adapting environmental policy to new problems and
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doctrine, although an old legal framework, might fill the gaps in or
supplement the existing public and private legal regimes described in
Part II to make them more effective at protecting private lands for use
by migrating wildlife fleeing from the effects of climate change.157
A. The Public Trust Doctrine
The common law doctrine of public trust is based on the proposi-
tion that the sovereign holds certain common properties in trust in
perpetuity for the free and unimpeded use of the general public.158
changing realities without legislation in an era in which Congress is paralyzed”).
Aagaard’s solution to the current legislative impasse is not administrative
lawmaking, but rather “employing non-environmental statutes to accomplish en-
vironmental objectives.” Id. at 38.
157. Patrick Redmond, The Public Trust in Wildlife: Two Steps Forward, Two Steps
Back, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 249, 306 (2009) (“[Courts] generally resort to glances
at the common law to ‘fill gaps’ in regulatory concepts or definitions, to address
special harms suffered by particular individuals or communities, or to allow re-
covery of damages.”).  Professor Mary Wood has developed this argument in the
context of global climate change, arguing that there is a federal trust enforceable
against the government for failing to take steps to reduce emissions of green-
house gases. See Mary Christina Wood & Dan Gilpern, Atmospheric Recovery
Litigation: Making the Fossil Fuel Industry Pay to Restore a Viable Climate Sys-
tem, 45 ENVTL. L. 259 (2015) (employing an atmospheric public trust approach to
establish a framework of global responsibility); Mary Christina Wood, “You Can’t
Negotiate with a Beetle”: Environmental Law for the New Ecological Age, 50 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 167, 201 (2010) [hereinafter Wood, New Ecological Age]; Mary
Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the
Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part 1): Ecological Realism and
the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43 (2009) (calling for the public trust
doctrine to be expanded to system of protection for natural resources against
threats of climate change and ecological collapse); MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY
CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW (2013).  Professor Wood has also launched an ambitious litiga-
tion initiative to compel the EPA to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. See Alec L.
v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing claim against EPA
Administrator for failing to protect the atmosphere under the public trust doc-
trine for failing to state a claim because since that claim is grounded in state law
it does not raise a federal question), aff’d sub nom. Alec L. v. McCarthy ex rel.
Loorz, 561 Fed. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 774 (2014); see
also Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in CLIMATE CHANGE
READER 4–6 (W.H. Rodgers, Jr. & M. Robinson-Dorn eds., 2009), https://
law.uoregon.edu/images/uploads/entries/atmo.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/KZ8G-
AGUC]; Mary Christina Wood, The Planet on the Docket: Atmospheric Trust Liti-
gation to Protect Earth’s Climate System and Habitability, 9 FLA. A&M U. L. REV.
259 (2014) (explaining her legal approach).
158. See Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L. Q.
351, 351 (1998) (“Until it was revived and re-invented by Sax, the doctrine held
that some resources, particularly lands beneath navigable waters or washed by
the tides, are either inherently the property of the public at large, or are at least
subject to a kind of inherent easement for certain public purposes.  Those pur-
poses are foremost navigation and travel, to a lesser extent fishing, and lesser
still recreation and public gatherings.”).
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The government in essence is merely a usufructuary rights holder who
cannot allow resources protected by the trust to be damaged.159  “The
public trust doctrine is a ‘principle of vital importance’ that refers to
the general fiduciary obligation of government toward its citizens, and
to the related, fundamental understanding that no legislature can ab-
dicate or irrevocably alienate its core sovereign powers.”160  The doc-
trine requires that property to which the trust applies must be used
for a public purpose and must be available to public use, that trust-
protected property cannot be sold, even for a fair price, and that the
holder of trust-protected property must maintain it for particular uses
like for recreation or wildlife habitat.161  The doctrine protects public
rights in trust resources in perpetuity and prevents the government or
private individuals from alienating or otherwise adversely affecting
those rights unless for another equivalent public purpose.162
The doctrine places on governments “an affirmative, ongoing duty
to safeguard the long-term preservation of those resources for the ben-
efit of the general public.”163  This makes the doctrine “a fundamental
limitation on governmental power,”164 the beneficiaries of which are
159. Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4 WAKE
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281, 287 (2014); see also id. at 288 (“The public trust doctrine
embodies this idea that every generation has a usufructuary right in the re-
sources of the Earth, and those interests are protected by the inherently limited
ownership allowed in natural resources.”); Coplan, supra note 5, at 324
(“[R]eference to usufructuary rights suggests that, although the state may allo-
cate the sustainable fruits of public trust assets, it may not allocate rights in the
underlying resource itself.  To put the matter in conventional trust terms—the
sovereign, as trustee, may distribute the income of public trust assets, but may
not sell off the corpus.”).
160. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 159, at 286 (quoting Butchers’ Union Co. v. Cres-
cent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 766 (1884)).
161. Sax, supra note 4, at 477.
162. Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect Where
the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-O-Links, and Other Things that Go Bump
in the Night, 85 IOWA L. REV. 849, 889–98 (2000) (summarizing salient aspects of
the public trust doctrine); see also Torres & Bellinger, supra note 60, at 286 (“The
public trust doctrine is meant to protect those resources that have an inherently
public character and are not owned in the same way as traditional property.”);
Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Wildlife Trust: A Reinterpretation of Section
7 of the Endangered Species Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 605, 612 (2004) (“[G]overnment
trustees are required to preserve wildlife assets and protect them against
damage.”).
163. Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Chart-
ing Its Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 667 (2012); see also J. Peter Byrne, The
Public Trust Doctrine, Legislation, and Green Property: A Future Convergence?,
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 915, 918 (2012) (“Public trust rights are understood to
precede and constrain legislative action to a larger extent than do private prop-
erty rights.”).
164. Wood, New Ecological Age, supra note 157, at 201; see also Wood, supra note 162,
at 612 (this capacity to “constrain the natural tendency of governmental officials
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“present and future generations of citizens.”165  The essence of the
doctrine requires management of trust resources for public benefit,
not for private gain or political advantage.166
The fact that the public trust doctrine is a restraint on how private
property can be used makes it extremely controversial.167  “Imposing
highly concentrated costs of habitat protection on a small number of
landowners in order to provide a broad public environmental benefit is
a recipe for backlash.”168  According to Jamison Colburn, “[t]he prob-
lem is not that our federalism or anything else in our Constitution
deprives us of the authority needed to build larger or more integrated
systems of public reserves,” rather that the American land ethic has
remained basically possessory and divisionary in nature.”169  The pub-
lic trust doctrine is in fundamental tension with this core belief. But a
right to real property:
“is not absolute, [it is] a maxim of the common law that one should . . . use his
property” in a way that does not “injure the rights of others.”  This maxim
expresses “the inevitable proposition that rights are relative . . . and must be
[accommodating] when they meet. . . . [W]hile society will protect the owner in
his permissible interests in land, yet [s]uch an owner must expect to find the
absoluteness of his property rights curtailed by the organs of society, for the
promotion of the best interests of others for whom these organs also operate as
protective agencies. . . .[property] “serves human values [and is] recognized to
that end.”170
Indeed, common law property doctrines, like the public trust doctrine,
have “evolved into a law of accommodation”—evolving in response to
to exhaust resources in the present generation” acts like “a normative anchor . . .
geared towards sustaining society for generations to come”).
165. Wood, New Ecological Age, supra note 157, at 201.
166. Id. at 201; see also Lynn S. Shaffer, Pulled From Thin Air: The (Mis)Application
of Statutory Displacement to a Public Trust Claim In Alec L. v. Jackson, 19 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 169, 192 (2015) (“The limits placed on the sovereign body re-
present the true power of the trust, especially when the government violates fidu-
ciary duties to protect trust property from impairment, damage, or waste.”).
167. Fischman & Hyman, supra note 79, at 218 (“[T]he application of constraints on
private land use, like those remains among the very most controversial aspects of
federal environmental law.”); see also Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine:
An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 239, 275 (1992) (“Any body of law
will be fuzzy around the edges; that [cannot] be helped.  But the notion of an
evolving unbounded set of communal rights—whether they are constitutional or
common law, procedural or substantive, in all public and private property strips
clarity, certainty, and predictability from the very core of the public trust doc-
trine.”) (quoted in George P. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust
Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 307, 327–38 (2006)).
168. Fischman & Hyman, supra note 79, at 226.
169. Colburn, supra note 133, at 654.
170. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372–73 (N.J. 1971).
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societal needs and efficiency.171  While property rules protect the ex-
pectations of property owners, “those expectations are bounded by
what a state chooses to recognize as entitled to protection.”172  In
other words, “while there are some bedrock principles that protect
property, those same principles are not etched in that bedrock. In-
stead, as human needs change so do property rights.  Communities
created property and communities can curtail it.”173  Indeed, human-
ity’s adaption to the effects of climate change could become a matter of
global survival, warranting a “rebalancing of public and private inter-
ests,”174 toward a less individualistic view of property.  Craig argues
that the threat of climate change should by itself “be sufficient to
prompt revitalized legal attention to the public and community values
of private property and to the legal doctrines that give cognizance to
those values: nuisance, the public trust doctrine, and public
necessity.”175
The public trust doctrine has been part of American jurisprudence
for centuries.176  Something like the public trust doctrine was refer-
enced in Article III of the 1783 Peace Treaty between Britain and the
United States ending the Revolutionary War, in which the parties
“agreed that the People of the United States shall continue to enjoy
unmolested the Right to take Fish” at various identified spots and
“also on the Coasts, Bays & Creeks of all other of his Britannic Maj-
esty’s Dominions in America . . . .”177  And, while the Massachusetts
Bay Colony’s Ordinances of 1641–1647 bestowed on riparian landown-
ers the right to build structures below the high water mark on tidal
waters, it explicitly withheld “the public trust right of the public to
cross such underwater lands for navigation, fishing, and fowling.”178
Later, the Northwest Ordinance stated that the Mississippi and St.
Lawrence Rivers should be “common highways, and forever free,” re-
171. Shelby D. Green, No Entry to the Public Lands: Towards a Theory of a Public
Trust Servitude for a Way Over Abutting Private Land, 14 WY. L. REV. 19, 58
(2014).
172. Id. at 74.
173. Id.
174. Craig, supra note 7, at 62.
175. Id. at 63.
176. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821) (affirming state holds submerged lands in
trust for people of the state); see also Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
367, 413–14 (1842) (“[F]rom 1702 . . . until a very recent date, the people of New
Jersey have exercised and enjoyed the rights of fishery for shellfish and floating
fish, as a common and undoubted right”); Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen,
The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437, 1441–1451 (2013) (describ-
ing the evolution of the American public trust doctrine).
177. Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and His Britan-
nic Majesty, Gr. Brit.–U.S., art. III, Sept. 30, 1783, 8 Stat. 80 [hereinafter Treaty
of Paris].
178. Coplan, supra note 5, at 305.
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flecting public trust principles of open access.179  Some scholars con-
tend that the public trust doctrine is an “inherent right[] that pre-
dates the United States Constitution,” functioning like “the chalk-
board on which the Constitution was written,” and that the doctrine
provides “the background and context for the Constitution” itself.180
One feature of common law doctrines is their inherent nimbleness,
surpassing both statutes and executive orders in that regard.181  The
public trust doctrine has illustrated this malleability by evolving over
time to meet changing social circumstances.182  Courts originally ap-
plied the doctrine to traditional uses of coastal resources and tide-
lands—like navigation, fishing, and oystering—but now the doctrine
is applied to lakes,183 beaches,184 groundwater,185 and even moun-
179. Id.
180. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 159, at 288; see also id. at 289 (“In Robinson
Township v. Commonwealth, the Court stated: ‘[T]he concept that certain rights
are inherent to mankind, and thus secured rather than bestowed by the Constitu-
tion, has a long pedigree in Pennsylvania that goes back at least to the founding
of the Republic.’ ”) (citing Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 946–50
(Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion)).
181. Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 100, at 729–30 (“The Anglo-American com-
mon law system, for example, is in some ways more procedurally adaptive than
the legislative process.  A common law court has the capacity to distinguish previ-
ous cases when addressing new factual circumstances.  If Congress wants to
amend a statute to address a new situation not covered by existing law, or be-
cause changed circumstances have undercut the effectiveness of existing law, it
must follow the constitutionally prescribed method for changing the law—adop-
tion of the same bill by both houses of Congress and either presidential signature
or legislative override of a presidential veto by a two-thirds vote.”); see also J.B.
Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal
Systems—With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 77 N.C. L. REV.
1373, 1381 (2011) (describing the American common law system as “an example
of ecological resilience” with “a high capacity for swings in behavior in response to
changing conditions without altering the system’s basic structure and process de-
sign”); Valentine, supra note 10, at 103–04 (describing Congress’s hostile attitude
toward climate change as “demonstrating a profound disconnect between scien-
tific knowledge and the public perception about the risk of highly damaging im-
pacts of climate change,” and faulting the inadequate efforts by the executive
branch “to meet the scope of the challenge presented by climate change”).
182. See Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 176, at 1443–51 (citing cases illustrating doc-
trine’s expansion to cover more natural resources in response to public needs); see
also Coplan, supra note 5, at 321 (“As civilization exercises increasing dominion
over the Justinian list of trust assets, the law has developed to enforce societal
expectations in the commonality and permanence of these public resources.”); E.
Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
38, 51 (1985) (referring to Justice Holmes’s “claim that legal doctrines evolve in
response to changes in the social environment has become virtually a canon of
professional faith for American lawyers”).
183. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983),
cert. denied sub nom. City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y,
464 U.S. 997.
184. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
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tains,186 and is used to protect non-traditional uses of trust resources
like recreation, scientific study, bird watching, and aesthetics.187
185. Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., Case No. 34-2010-80000583
(Cal. Super. Ct. July 15, 2014); see also Cty. of Siskiyou v. Superior Court of Sac-
ramento Cty., No. S220764 (Cal. Feb. 18, 2015) (denying petition for writ of man-
date allowing it to skip intermediate review by state court of appeals); In re
Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000) (holding public trust
doctrine applies to groundwater).
186. Although the decision in Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 350 Ma. 410,
215 N.E.2d 114 (1966), applying the public trust doctrine to the expansion of a ski
resort on a mountain top, was issued four years before Sax’s article and, there-
fore, his article cannot claim to have influenced it, he thought the decision was
particularly important in understanding the broader importance of the public
trust doctrine because the decision reflected a use of the doctrine to democratize
the administrative process by placing on administrative agencies “the burden of
establishing an affirmative case before the legislature in the full light of public
attention.”  Sax, supra note 4, at 499; see also id. at 498 (“That state’s supreme
judicial court has penetrated one of the very difficult problems of American gov-
ernment—inequality of access to, and influence over, administrative agencies.  It
has struck directly at low-visibility decision making, which is the most pervasive
manifestation of the problem.  By a simple but ingenious flick of the doctrinal
wrist, the court has forced agencies to bear the burden of obtaining specific, overt
approval of efforts to invade the public trust.”).
187. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (finding that the public
trust doctrine applied to collection of scientific information, bird watching, and
aesthetics); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893) (recognizing
recreational uses as within the scope of the public trust doctrine); Borough of
Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972) (apply-
ing the public trust doctrine to recreational uses).  Not surprisingly, the doc-
trine’s expansion drew critics. See William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and
the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine,
and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385,
402–03 (1997) (worrying that expansion of the doctrine made more acute its un-
democratic nature, the freedom it gives nonexpert courts to second guess admin-
istrative decisions on complex, highly technical matters, and the danger that
courts will denigrate private property rights in favor of public trust uses); James
L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust Doc-
trine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 8–9 (2007) (debunking popular historical
account of the doctrine’s origins and migration to the United States); Richard J.
Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Re-
sources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV.  631, 631–33
(1986) (complaining the doctrine was the equivalent of an oxymoron in an age of
environmental protection laws and saying “the historical function of the public
trust doctrine has been to provide a public property basis for resisting the exer-
cise of private property rights in natural resources deemed contrary to the public
interest.  In recent decades, however . . . modern trends in natural resources law
increasingly have eroded traditional concepts of private property rights in natu-
ral resources and substituted new notions of sovereign power over these re-
sources.  These trends . . . . are currently weaving a new fabric for natural
resources law that is more responsive to current social values and the physical
characteristics of the resources.  By continuing to resist a legal system that is
otherwise being abandoned, the public trust doctrine obscures analysis and ren-
ders more difficult the important process of reworking natural resources law.”);
see also James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a
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“While such evolutions and expansions complicate the identity—in-
deed, the very existence—of any unitary, national, perhaps Constitu-
tion-based public trust doctrine, they also provide place-based
balancing of public and private needs and values . . . that may better
serve the long-term interests of the nation as a whole.”188
This is not to say that there are not disadvantages with adaptive
legal systems, like the common law doctrine of public trust.  A less
adaptive legal system may result in more consistent application of le-
gal rules by decision makers, with results that are more fair, predict-
able, coherent, and certain.189  Certainty can encourage investment in
and advance commitment to certain outcomes.190  Non-adaptive sys-
tems may be administered more efficiently because decision makers,
like agencies, do not have to invent new approaches on an ad hoc basis
to each problem, but get to choose from a limited number of prescribed
and pre-tested solutions.191  In contrast, adaptive systems create im-
plementation and opportunity costs.192  “[S]ubstantive legal adaptive
capacity also may increase the risk that agencies will abuse their dis-
cretionary authority,” perhaps even favoring special interests over the
broader interests of the general public.193  “Statutory constraints on
substantive flexibility can minimize such ‘slippage.’”194  Nonetheless,
over the centuries the public trust doctrine has played a useful role in
protecting natural resources, including nontraditional trust resources,
which belong to and are used by the public in nontraditional ways.
This fact alone makes it of interest here.
B. Strong Federal Interest in Wildlife
A variant of the public trust doctrine is a public trust in wildlife.195
However, the doctrine is not on as strong a footing as the public trust
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989) (criticizing judicial expansion
of public trust doctrine); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Com-
merce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 722 (1986) (“De-
spite its popularity, the modern public trust doctrine is notoriously vague as to its
own subject matter; cases and academic commentaries normally fall back on the
generality that the content of the public trust is ‘flexible’ in response to ‘changing
public needs.’”).
188. Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological
Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 92 (2010).
189. Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 100, at 735.
190. Id. at 736.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 737.
193. Id. at 736.
194. Id.
195. Joining the public trust doctrine to other doctrines is not that unusual. See, e.g.,
David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the
Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 711–13 (2008) (proposing a
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doctrine,196 even in those jurisdictions that accept the public trust
doctrine.197  “[T]he path to judicial recognition of the public trust in
wildlife has not been smooth. Indeed, this path has been . . . criss-
crossed and rutted with competing doctrines of constitutional limita-
tions, property rights, and statutory and agency mandates.”198  On
the other hand, some legal scholars, like Professors Michael Blumm
and Patrick Redmond, believe that courts are moving to blend the two
doctrines at the state level creating not only a duty on the state sover-
eign to protect wildlife and wildlife habitat, but also a duty to recog-
nize a public right to enforce that duty.199  Professor Redmond, for
example, describes how California courts allow public and private law-
suits alleging that the government or individuals have not sufficiently
protected wildlife “as both a public trust purpose and a public trust
resource within the doctrine’s scope.”200  He notes in addition that
Michigan includes wildlife within its public trust doctrine,201 and Wis-
consin courts consider it to be a well-established principle that the
state holds title to wildlife for the benefit of its citizens, even though
the state’s courts have never found that wildlife is covered by the pub-
lic trust doctrine and consider the doctrine to only extend to navigable
waterways.202
synthesis of the public trust doctrine and human rights in response to climate
change and other modern environmental issues) (cited in Reed Watson, Public
Wildlife on Private Land: Unifying the Split Estate to Enhance Trust Resources,
23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 291, 294 n.20 (2013)).
196. State ownership of wildlife is less contested than acknowledging the sovereign’s
trust responsibilities over wildlife. See Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 176, at
1451 (“[D]espite some confusion about the viability of the Geer decision, state
ownership of wildlife in a sovereign capacity is overwhelmingly the majority
view.”).
197. Id. at 257; see also id. at 310 (“As one front in the effort toward a ‘new ethical
framework’ for environmental decision-making, then, an expanded public trust in
wildlife has recently suffered as many defeats as it has enjoyed victories.”).
198. Id. at 304; see Watson, supra note 195, at 299–300 n.42 (saying after the Idaho
Supreme Court found that the public trust doctrine applied to wildlife in Koote-
nai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P. 2d 1085 (Idaho 1983),
the Idaho legislature passed a law declaring that Idaho’s public trust doctrine
was “solely a limitation on the power of the state to alienate or encumber the title
to the beds of navigable waters.”).
199. See Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 176, at 1488 (“Given the states’ widespread
statutory and constitutional recognition of the wildlife trust, it is likely that more
courts will soon recognize that state ownership of wildlife is part of the public
trust doctrine, thus imposing duties and empowering states to ensure wise stew-
ardship of wild animals and their habitats.”).
200. Redmond, supra note 157, at 271.
201. Id. at 276.
202. Id. at 283; see id. at 288 (observing that “Wisconsin courts have declined to find
within evolving societal values or the state’s Environmental Protection Act a rea-
son to expand the trust’s scope to include wildlife or natural resources in
general”).
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Even though there are two cases in which federal courts have ar-
guably found that there is a federal public trust interest in wildlife,203
that argument does not need to be made here.  Confusion at the state
level over the existence of a trust over wildlife, whether as part of the
public trust doctrine or a free-standing trust, does not diminish the
federal government’s strong sovereign interest in and authority over
wildlife that resides on or temporarily moves off of federal lands.  The
wellspring of this sovereign interest originally resided in the King of
England, like the public trust doctrine, and, like the public trust doc-
trine, became part of American legal culture in the nineteenth
century.204
Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland declared the interest of the
United States in the protection of wild birds to be “a national interest
of very nearly the first magnitude.”205  He added that he saw “nothing
in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food
supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our crops are
destroyed,” and that it was “not sufficient to rely upon the states” to
protect such important resources.206  The federal interest in wildlife
has repeatedly preempted the state interest in wildlife when the latter
interest conflicted with the interest of the United States.  For exam-
ple, in Kleppe v. New Mexico,207 the Supreme Court found the federal
interest in the wellbeing of wild burros under the Property Clause suf-
ficient to prevent a private rancher from removing them from federal
lands.208  Although the Kleppe Court refused to speculate on whether
203. In re Steuart Transportation Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980) (finding that
both the federal government and the Commonwealth of Virginia had a trust in-
terest in wildlife, which allowed both jurisdictions to bring a lawsuit seeking pen-
alties and cost recovery against an oil tanker for the deaths of thousands of
migratory birds, and saying  “under the public trust doctrine, the State of Vir-
ginia and the United States have the right and the duty to protect and preserve
the public’s interest in natural wildlife resources.”); State v. Sorensen, 436
N.W.2d 358, 362 (Iowa 1989) (second alteration in the original) (referring to a
Nebraska court that opined the federal government holds the nation’s natural
resources in trust entitling it to recover for the loss of wildlife from a fire alleg-
edly caused by a private railroad company).
204. See generally Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 176 (describing the evolution of the
concept of sovereign ownership of wildlife and suggesting its merger with the
public trust doctrine); see also Hope M. Babcock, supra note 162, 880–89 (discuss-
ing adoption of the English view of Crown authority over wildlife and the state
wildlife trust doctrine).
205. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
206. Id.
207. 426 U.S. 529, 529 (1976) (acknowledging the state’s police power over wildlife in
their jurisdiction, but found that this authority was subordinate to the powers of
the federal government over wild burros on federal lands).
208. See also Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1227 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Kleppe, 425 U.S. at 540–41) (interpreting the “complete power that Congress has
over public lands” as “necessarily” including “the power to regulate and protect
the wildlife living there”).
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the Property Clause extended to protected animals that merely set a
“foot upon federal lands” at any time and then wandered onto private
lands,209 it did note that the Property Clause can “have some effect on
private lands not otherwise under federal control,”210 citing Camfield
v. United States.211  In Wyoming v. United States, the Tenth Circuit
found that in light of the “complete power” Congress has over public
lands as “necessarily”—including “the power to regulate and protect
the wildlife living there”—and concluded that the state did not have
the right to manage wildlife where that management would contra-
vene federal authority.212 In an earlier Tenth Circuit case, the court
ordered the removal of an antelope-proof fence that interfered with
the ability of antelope to migrate to winter feeding grounds, specifi-
cally finding that winter foraging by antelope is a lawful purpose of
public lands.213  These cases illustrate the federal government’s
strong interest in the survival of its resident wildlife.
Perhaps then, given that strong federal interest in wildlife, it
would not be an untoward extension of the federal government’s au-
thority to protect wildlife that resides on its lands when it moves off
those lands in search of new protected habitat.214  However, this pro-
posal would aggravate the tension between private ownership of wild-
life habitat and public management of wildlife,215 in part triggered by
209. The Court in Kleppe, however, held open the question of whether federal regula-
tion of wild horses and burros on private lands would be constitutional under the
Property Clause simply because “at any time . . . [they set] . . . foot upon federal
land[,]” finding it inappropriate in a declaratory judgment proceeding “to deter-
mine the extent, if any, to which the Property Clause empowers Congress to pro-
tect animals on private lands . . . .” Kleppe, 425 U.S. at 546.
210. Id.; see also id. at 538 (describing the “sole message” from Camfield as being that
“the Property Clause is broad enough to reach beyond territorial limits”); see also
Sax, supra note 97, at 239 (“The [United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927)]
and Camfield cases establish unambiguously that the property clause permits
federal regulation of private land,” noting that in 1976, the Court “expressly reaf-
firmed Camfield.”).
211. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
212. Wyoming vs. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1227 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Kleppe, 426 U.S. 540–41) (“In our view, the ‘complete power’ that Congress has
over public lands necessarily includes the power to regulate and protect the wild-
life living there.”).
213. U.S. ex rel. Bergen v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir. 1988).
214. Sax suggests that federal land managers should be able to regulate activities be-
yond legislated boundaries based on nuisance theory as was affirmed in Alford
and Camfield. See Sax, supra note 97, at 266.
215. Watson, supra note 195, at 292.  Watson describes this as a kind of split estate
with overlapping valuable resources, the rights to which are held by separate and
distinct entities. Id. at 293.  Predator species like wolves and grizzly bears as
well as ungulates like bison and elk present their own conflicts with private land-
owners like ranchers because of predation and disease.
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resistance to government access to private property.216  The fact that
federal agency employees might need to go on private property to de-
termine how migrating wildlife are faring, the adequacy of the area for
wildlife use, and whether wildlife are still using the property as
habitat would feed into that tension.217  Damage done to private prop-
erty by wildlife, like broken fences, trampled or eaten crops, and kill-
ing of domestic animals, is another point of tension and could create
opposition to making property more hospitable to climate migrants.218
But while this opposition does not lessen the federal government’s
strong interest in protecting resident wildlife even when it moves off
of public lands, it does counsel caution in how that interest might be
given effect.
The Article so far has demonstrated the federal sovereign has a
strong protective interest in wildlife that inhabits public lands, even
when it leaves those lands, and that the public trust doctrine, which
has some features that may be useful here, has evolved to protect non-
traditional trust resources and non-traditional uses of those resources.
All that remains is to show there is a federal public trust doctrine
that, when coupled with the strong federal interest in wildlife, will
protect wildlife as it moves over or onto private lands in search of
more suitable habitat, whether water-based or not.  It is to that task
that the next Part of the Article turns.
V. THREE THEORIES SUPPORTING THE EXISTENCE OF A
FEDERAL PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND WHY IT
HAS NOT BEEN DISPLACED BY
STATUTORY LAW
Without a silver bullet, we must employ a shotgun approach.219
As noted previously, the public trust doctrine sidesteps the need to
achieve political consensus among competing stakeholders as would
216. Id. at 296–97; see also id. (noting the existence of a question whether “the pres-
ence of a publicly owned resource on private land creates a public access right or
easement over that private land”).
217. Id. at 297 (“No Western state has yet recognized a public access right across pri-
vate land based solely on the presence of terrestrial wildlife, perhaps because the
stream access disputes have been so contentious.”).  Watson, however, is confi-
dent that with the “expanding conception of the public trust doctrine” and the
parallels between stream access and wildlife—both are fugitive resources man-
aged for the public benefit—there will soon be parallel litigation in which liti-
gants seek “to apply the stream access rationale to terrestrial wildlife.” Id. at
297.
218. Id. at 293; see also id. at 298 (adding that landowners bear the costs of repairing
countless miles of wildlife-damaged fences, usually without any compensation).
219. Fischman, supra note 56, at 286.  Although referring to combatting global climate
change, the quote appears equally apt to this Article’s approach to finding a basis
for a federal doctrine of public trust.
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be required for any legislative or local collaborative effort to designate
and protect a migration corridor, and avoids having to buy land, when
funds may be unavailable and time of the essence.220  But why push
for a federal version of the doctrine, the existence of which has been
long debated by scholars,221 when there has been a less contested
state version for centuries? And why push for its expansion to non-
water-based wildlife habitat?  “Case law suggests that at best, the fed-
eral government is a co-trustee of wildlife and water resources,”222
and even though states have extended public trust principles to cover
wildlife,223 no federal court “has yet made the leap from water-based
trust resources to strictly land based resources, at least in the absence
of a statutory scheme incorporating trust principles.”224  The principal
answer to these questions is pragmatic—only the federal version of
the doctrine can be coterminous with the interstate migratory corri-
dors that need protection and most of those corridors cross dry land.
A. Federal Doctrine of Public Trust
Electing not to parse or extend the work of other scholars who read
into federal case law recognition of a federal public trust doctrine,225
220. See Cherney, supra note 62, at 616 (“The most technically elegant—and often
inspiring—form of migratory conservation is to permanently protect corridors
through comprehensive legislation.  While this type of design is elegant, such ef-
forts are unlikely to be both comprehensive and politically viable in complex po-
litical landscapes.  Alternative approaches often suggest fully inclusive
collaboration among diverse stakeholders to find mutually agreeable solutions.
While equally noble in principle, finding consensus among divergent political per-
spectives is no easy task.”).
221. Shaffer, supra note 166, at 171; see also id. at 182–83 (“The question of whether
causes of action based in public trust doctrine arise strictly as a matter of state
law, or whether they can arise under both state and federal law remains an open
one, despite the Supreme Court’s decision in PPL Montana.”); Robert L.
Glicksman, Sustainable Federal Land Management: Protecting Ecological Integ-
rity and Preserving Environmental Principles, 44 TULSA L. REV. 147, 183 (2008)
(“As Professor Pearson has explained, the public trust doctrine ‘exists only nomi-
nally in federal law . . . . [I]n federal law, the doctrine effectively is a non-player,’
so that the government can manage federal lands and resources ‘free and clear’ of
any common law-derived public trust duties.”).
222. Lance Noel & Jeremy Firestone, Public Trust Doctrine Implications of Electricity
Production, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 169, 191 (2015).  The authors go on to
say that the United States “has an obligation to protect uniquely federal interests
in these resources.” Id.
223. Coplan, supra note 5, at 318.
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Schaffer, supra note 166, at 172 n.7 (saying “a long line of both federal
and state cases—none of which were discussed or cited by either the district court
or the D.C. Circuit—have explicitly recognized a federal-trust responsibility as
the basis for the federal government’s authority to protect the public domain”); id.
(quoting Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911) (“All the public lands of
the nation are held in trust for the people of the whole country.”)); id. (paraphras-
ing United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160 (1890)); United
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this Article finds support for a federalized version in the doctrine it-
self, in the close parallels between state and federal powers with re-
spect to protecting and managing natural resources, and in the Ninth
Amendment.  These bases are discussed below as is an argument that
the doctrine has risen to the level of a constitutional convention, to
which courts might apply interpretative tropes like the hard look
doctrine.
First, there is no basis in the doctrine itself that restricts its appli-
cation to the states.  From its origins, the public trust doctrine has
been considered an attribute of sovereignty by necessity.226  “The idea
that public trust limits and powers inhere in the very nature of sover-
eignty is one consistent thread in public trust cases.”227  The doctrine
was originally applied against the King of England to protect the com-
moners’ rights of navigation and fishing.228  The language in Article
States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 342 (1888) (“The public domain is held by the Gov-
ernment as part of its trust. The Government is charged with the duty and
clothed with the power to protect it from trespass and unlawful appropriation
. . . .”); United States v. CB & I Constructors, Inc., 685 F.3d 827, 836 (9th Cir.
2012) (“In the public lands context, the federal government is more akin to a
trustee that holds natural resources for the benefit of present and future genera-
tions.”); Germania Iron Co. v. United States, 58 F. 334, 336 (8th Cir. 1893) (“As
has been frequently declared, in substance, the government is clothed with a
trust in respect to the public domain.”), aff’d, 165 U.S. 379 (1897); Conner v. U.S.
Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1219 (D. Nev. 1999) (“The United
States holds public lands in trust and has the right and obligation to protect
those lands from trespass.”); United States v. Burlington N. R.R., 710 F. Supp.
1286, 1287 (D. Neb. 1989) (“Although the public trust doctrine traditionally ap-
plied to tidal waters and the land submerged beneath them, the concept of the
United States holding its land in trust for the general population has been extant
for quite some time.”); In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va.
1980) (“Under the public trust doctrine, the State of Virginia and the United
States have the right and the duty to protect and preserve the public’s interest in
natural wildlife resources.”); Mendiola v. Graham, 10 P.2d 911, 914 (Or. 1932);
Sw. Wash. Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Fender, 150 P.2d 983, 986 (Wash. 1944).
226. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 49 (1821) (“But inasmuch as the things which con-
stitute this common property are things in which a sort of transient usufructuary
possession, only, can be had; and inasmuch as the title to them and to the soil by
which they are supported, and to which they are appurtenant, cannot well, ac-
cording to the common law notion of title, be vested in all the people; therefore,
the wisdom of that law has placed it in the hands of the sovereign power, to be
held, protected, and regulated for the common use and benefit.”).
227. Coplan, supra note 5, at 311; see also id. at 312 (“Since public trust doctrine is a
pre-existing limit on the scope of state sovereignty, Thornton suggests that the
pre-existing rights of the people in trust assets—at a minimum, rights to naviga-
tion and fishing—are reserved by the Tenth Amendment.”); id. (citing U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)) (holding that the Tenth Amend-
ment only reserves to states those sovereign powers in existence at the time of
founding of the United States and reserves to the people those aspects of sover-
eignty not residing in the States).
228. See Robin Kundis Craig, Mobil Oil Exploration, Environmental Protection, and
Contract Repudiation: It’s Time to Recognize the Public Trust in the Outer Conti-
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III of the 1783 Treaty of Paris giving Americans the right to continue
“to enjoy unmolested the right to take fish,” at any place in what had
been part of the British Empire229 implies that the manner of enjoy-
ment would be similar to what British subjects enjoyed—in other
words, that the duty to protect the public trust rights of citizens would
continue to reside in the supreme sovereign, the federal government.
When first applied in the United States, it was mere happenstance
that the doctrine arose in a New Jersey state court in a case involving
public access to oyster beds in Raritan Bay230; it could have as easily
arisen in a federal court as demonstrated by two later Supreme Court
decisions entertaining the doctrine, one of which was only a little over
a decade later than the New Jersey court decision.231  Until recent
statements in Montana Public Power & Light v. Montana,232 and Alec
L. v. Jackson,233 saying, in dicta, the public trust doctrine was a mat-
ter of state, not federal, law courts have not opined on the doctrine’s
possible federal existence.  The one exception is a case involving the
crash of an Eastern Airlines jet in the Potomac River, where the court
declined to rule on the existence of a federal version of the doctrine
because it had not been raised below, even though the court found the
concept interesting.234
nental Shelf, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 11104, 11116 (2000) (“[I]n America, the public
trust doctrine applies primarily to states, not the federal government,” although
nothing prevents it from applying to the federal government “because the doc-
trine derives from the English monarch’s national sovereignty.”).
229. Treaty of Paris, supra note 177.
230. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821) (affirming state holds submerged lands in trust for the
people).
231. See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 413–14 (1842) (“[F]rom
1702 . . . until a very recent date, the people of New Jersey have exercised and
enjoyed the rights of fishery for shellfish and floating fish, as a common and un-
doubted right.”); see also Shively v. Bowlby, 1 U.S. 152 (1894) (holding public
trust principles applied to curtail riparian property rights under congressional
land grant).  Wilkinson says of Shively that it is “the clearest exposition that the
United States was limited by the classic public trust doctrine in dealing with
navigable watercourses before statehood.”  Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 301; Co-
plan, supra note 5, at 307 (contending that this case was “apparently” decided as
a matter of federal common law because of its application of Arnold).
232. 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012).
233. 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F.
App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
234. The D.C. Circuit explained why it declined to reach the questions involved in
declaring the existence of a federal public trust doctrine. See District of Columbia
v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1078–79 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Our decision not to
consider the District’s public trust claim is reinforced by our belief that the argu-
ment that public trust duties pertain to federal navigable waters, such as the
section of the Potomac River at issue here, raises a number of very difficult issues
concerning the rights and obligations of the United States (which is not a party
here), the creation of federal common law, and the delegation of trust duties to
the District.”).
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A second argument builds on the constitutive similarities between
federal and state governmental authority.  Since federal and state
governments each exists for the benefit of the public each serves, and
each government holds title to land and natural resources as a repre-
sentative of that public, there are no discontinuities between them in
this regard.  Further, the constitutional authority under which the
federal government manages and protects its land (the Property
Clause) “is essentially indistinguishable from the constitutional au-
thority under which states operate (the police power).”235  The Prop-
erty Clause and state police power are “exceedingly broad authorities
authorizing a wide range of actions for a wide variety of reasons.”236
According to Coplan, “if the public trust is essential to the nature of
sovereignty and encompasses rights reserved to the people generally,
then the doctrine applies equally to the sovereign federal government
as it does to the sovereign state governments.”237  Wilkinson suggests
that there should actually be fifty one public trust doctrines—one in
every state and a federal version.238  Then why should not the public
trust doctrine, which is designed to serve the public interest, “take on
parallel contours at both the state and federal levels?”239
Indeed, if there is no “limiting doctrine pertaining to a specific type
of trust resource,” like submerged lands or lands covered by the equal
footing doctrine, “there is no reason why public trust obligations do
not extend to the federal government.”240  According to Wilkinson,
“the trust concept has been properly invoked as the best available for-
mulation of the central doctrinal forces in public land law—that in-
creasingly tough strictures are required, and have been imposed, on
land management officials; that land management is not a private
business; that ultimate accountability is to the public; and that over
time the public and Congress have come to place ever greater impor-
tance on the nation’s public natural resources.”241
Any argument that lands under the control of the federal govern-
ment should not be covered by the public trust doctrine cannot be
based on the “non-plenary nature of the federal government because,
as to resources it controls, the duty has always been plenary even if
the character of the government has both limited and plenary con-
235. See Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (“The general government
doubtless has a power over its own property analogous to the police power of the
several states, and the extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is
measured by the exigencies of the particular case.”).
236. Eric Pearson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Federal Law, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 173, 177 (2004).
237. Coplan, supra note 5, at 313.
238. Id.
239. Pearson, supra note 236, at 177.
240. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 159, at 295.
241. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 304.
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tent.”242  Further, the national importance of wildlife, as argued ear-
lier in this Article, and in many cases its interstate even international
character, implicates federal trust obligations.243
The third argument posits that the rights the public possess under
the public trust doctrine are unenumerated rights under the Ninth
Amendment,244 or alternatively rise to the level of a constitutional in-
terpretative convention, Sax’s hard look.245  The right of access to
public trust resources, the guarantee that those resources will not be
converted from a public to a private use, the right to enjoy trust re-
sources, and the obligation imposed by the doctrine on the sovereign to
protect those rights are not elsewhere enumerated in the Constitu-
242. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 159, at 296.
243. Id. at 296 (“For certain resources that bear a national character, the Supreme
Court has found that the public trust doctrine applies to them.  These national
resources often have interstate significance implicating federal trust obliga-
tions.”); see also id. at 296 n.59 (citing Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537
(1911) (“All the public lands of the nation are held in trust for the people of the
whole country.”)).
244. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“[E]numeration in the Constitution of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).  An
argument might also be made that the Preamble of the Constitution vests an
implied power in the government of the United States to promote the general
welfare and the public trust doctrine is essential to the general welfare.  For a
thorough discussion of implied powers as applied to the “necessary and proper
clause,” and specifically listing promotion of the general welfare as a governmen-
tal purpose, see John Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language:
Entailment, Implicature, and Implied Powers, 101 U. VA. L. REV. 1063, 1098
(2015); see also Coplan, supra note 5, at 310 (noting that “Richard Epstein has
argued that public trust limits on state action inhere in Equal Protection princi-
ples, as well as in the converse of the Takings Clause: grants of unequal rights to
public resources deprive other persons equal protection of the law, and the same
principle that requires compensation for the taking of private property precludes
inadequately compensated grants of public assets.  Other commentators have
placed the source of public trust limits in the Commerce Clause of the Constitu-
tion as an aspect of the implied guarantee of free navigation underlying Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis.  Others define the public trust doctrine as a vestige of
federal common law.”); Torres & Bellinger, supra note 159, at 290–94 (listing in
addition to the Preamble, the Reserved Powers Doctrine, the Equal Protection
Clause, the Due Process Clause as possible homes for the public trust doctrine);
Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 308–09 (“It is entirely possible that courts today
would find that the Property Clause includes some general trust notions and that
Congress is a constitutional trustee.”).
245. Coplan, supra note 5, at 316 (proposing that public trust principles might func-
tion like a rule of construction, or as a repository of moral and ethical values in
matters involving environmental or cultural resources).  Professor Joseph Sax
also viewed the public trust doctrine as a rule of construction, embodying inter-
pretative rules like the hard look doctrine.  Sax, supra note 4, at 509 (“Public
trust law is not so much a substantive set of standards for dealing with the public
domain as it is a technique by which courts may mend perceived imperfections in
the legislative and administrative process.”).
690 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:649
tion.246  Yet, this Article has shown that they are fundamental rights
that Americans have enjoyed for centuries and, therefore, would be
ones that had been “retained by the people at the enactment of the
Constitution,” as demonstrated by Article III of the Treaty of Paris.247
The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers of
the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, pro-
tected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those funda-
mental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional
amendments . . . . The Amendment . . . was introduced in Congress . . . and
passed the House and Senate with little or no debate and virtually no change
in language.  It was proffered to quiet expressed fears that a bill of specifically
enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover all essential rights
and that the specific mention of certain rights would be interpreted as a de-
nial that others were protected.248
Whether or not rights addressed in the Ninth Amendment are
viewed as “residual or negative rights” the chief purpose of which are
to limit the power of the federal government or as “a source of affirma-
tive or positive rights,” the conception of rights in the Ninth Amend-
ment “is inclusive enough to extend to a broad range of privileges and
prerogatives that modern thinkers would not typically identify as
moral or legal rights . . . [including] those individual rights that we
246. See Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment: Determin-
ing Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due Process, 32 U. BALT.
L. REV. 169, 215 (2003) (saying if the alleged right is governed by any other con-
stitutional provision, then that provision governs and “there is no Ninth Amend-
ment issue”).
247. Id. at 215; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381, 479, 493 (1965)  (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (establishing as a test for determining which rights should be pro-
tected by the Ninth Amendment whether the unenumerated rights were suffi-
ciently engrained in the traditions and collective conscience of the people so as to
be fundamental); Adam Lamparello, Fundamental Unenumerated Rights under
the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 49 AKRON L.
REV. 179, 184–85 (2016) (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 760
(2010) as saying “immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of
free government which no member of the Union may disregard”); id. (“In Palko v.
Connecticut, the Court held that the Due Process Clause protects rights that are
‘the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty’ and essential to ‘a fair and en-
lightened system of justice.’  This includes rights that are ‘so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’  In Duncan v.
Louisiana, the Court framed the fundamental rights inquiry as whether ‘a civi-
lized system could be imagined that would not accord the particular protec-
tion.’”).  Douglas in his dissent in Palmer v. Thompson, 430 U.S. 217, 233–34
(1971), advocated that the penumbra of rights protected by the Ninth Amend-
ment should include clean air and water as well as aquatic recreation.  For a
discussion of cases post-Griswold, see Joseph F. Kadlec, 48 B.C. L. REV. 387,
406–08 (2007).
248. Lamparello, supra note 247, at 199 (quoting Justice Goldberg in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488–89 (1965)); see also id. at 200 (“Simply put, the Fram-
ers did not intend ‘that the first eight amendments be construed to exhaust the
basic and fundamental rights which the Constitution guaranteed to the
people.’”).
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might call ‘fundamental’ and which the framers might have called
‘natural.’ ”249  For the limited purposes proposed in this Article, there
is no need to determine the exact meaning of the Ninth Amendment
either by parsing its text or its origins, or whether the Amendment’s
purpose is as an aid to federalism or the protection of individual
rights, let alone what interpretative rules should be applied to under-
stand its meaning.250  Rather, the Article’s quite limited assertion is
that the Ninth Amendment is capacious enough to provide support for
certain fundamental rights beyond those set out in the Constitution,
side stepping these and other controversial issues, including whether
unenumerated rights are enforceable.251
Nothing in the express semantic meaning of the Amendment either requires
courts to treat unenumerated “retained” rights as if they were constitutional
rights or precludes them from according enumerated constitutional rights
more favorable treatment than is accorded unenumerated rights.  At the same
time, however, the Amendment’s express command is equally clear that the
mere fact that a particular right has been enumerated in the Constitution
cannot be used as an argument for according some other “retained” right a
narrower scope or lesser protection than it would have received if the enumer-
ated right in question had not been included in the Constitution.252
Importantly, this Article has shown that the rights embodied in the
public trust doctrine are “fundamental to our scheme of ordered lib-
erty” and are “deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition,”253
and thus might qualify for constitutional recognition.
To not allow constitutions to breathe as it were, is to freeze consti-
tutional meaning across time, can create “a democratic deficit” for suc-
cessor generations.254  Recognizing public trust rights as
unenumerated rights under the Ninth Amendment does not create “a
249. Id. at 201 (quoting Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215, 1221 (1990)).
250. For a thorough examination of these topics and more, see Ryan C. Williams, The
Ninth Amendment as a Rule of Construction, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 498 (2011).
251. If, however, one wanted to create a judicially enforceable constitutional public
trust right, then one might see if it is located elsewhere in the Constitution, for
example in the Due Process Clause, in which case the Ninth Amendment might
supplement that right. See id. at 573 (“[T]he Ninth Amendment might play a
supporting role in the protection of such rights, both by precluding arguments
seeking to ‘deny or disparage’ such rights on the basis of their unenumerated
status and by showing the types of unenumerated rights members of the found-
ing generation may have viewed as important.”).
252. Id. at 531–32; see also id. at 572 (“All that the express language of the Ninth
Amendment commands is that the fact that certain rights have been enumerated
in the Constitution not be used as a basis for either denying the existence of other
‘retained’ rights or according such rights a lower level of protection or respect
than they would have received if the Constitution lacked an enumeration of
rights.”).
253. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 159, at 294 (citing MacDonald v. Chicago, 130 S.
Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (citation omitted)).
254. Richard Albert, How Unwritten Constitutional Norms Change Written Constitu-
tions, 38 DUBLIN U. L.J. 387, 406 (2015).
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dissonance between what the text says how political actors conduct
themselves . . . or in how the readers themselves perceive their rights
and duties.”255  Reading the text of the Ninth Amendment to encom-
pass public trust rights does no violation to the text nor to expected
“outcomes” that are generated by such an interpretation.256  If this
third argument is successful, then the Ninth Amendment gains for the
doctrine a federal constitutional purchase.257
An alternative argument to that proffered above with respect to
the Ninth Amendment, but one that still places a gloss of federal con-
stitutionality on the doctrine, is that the rights protected by the public
trust doctrine rise to the level of a constitutional convention—“a rule
that creates an obligation, confers rights or powers, or otherwise gov-
erns the conduct of political actors.”258  To become a constitutional
convention, the practice must be “rooted in normativity” and also “be
‘desirable in the circumstances of the Constitution.’”259  Constitu-
tional conventions are identifiable by the fact that people know about
them and conform their conduct to them.260  Over two hundred years
of judicial conformity to the dictates of the public trust doctrine, indi-
cates the existence of an unwritten rule that reflects what people actu-
ally do or are expected to do, a rule that “compels political actors to act
in a way that is not mandated by the constitutional text.”261
Federal courts might then rely on the existence of this convention
to apply a rule of construction, like the hard look doctrine, that would
place a higher burden of justification on any private or public entity
that seeks to diminish the public’s rights in a trust resource.262  This
255. Id. at 406–07.
256. Id. at 407 (“The payoff is the core promise of the rule of law: fair notice to those
governed by the text such that there exists symmetry between the expectations
the text creates and the outcomes it generates.”).
257. But see Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 307 (“Rather than finding a constitutional
footing for the trust, the Supreme Court might be more likely to tie the trust to a
comprehensive statutory scheme.”).  As this Article is only looking for support for
the concept of a federal public trust doctrine, the author is not intending to create
a constitutionally enforceable right.  If it were, then one might need to contend
with those who opine that although there are retained unenumerated rights,
judges may not enforce them. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91–92
(2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258. Albert, supra note 254, at 390.
259. Id. (quoting IVOR JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 136 (University of
London Press, 5th ed. 1967)).
260. Id.
261. Id. (saying, additionally, constitutional conventions “are knowable by the conduct
of others insofar as they ‘ultimately reflect what people do’”); see also Wilkinson,
supra note 1, at 304 (“The trust notion, as a generic concept, is an appropriate
description of the federal role in public land law. It is a common-sense description
that has evolved in regard to the inland public lands.”).
262. Coplan, supra note 5, at 334 (discussing the utility of public trust principles as
presenting “an interpretive principle that will limit the scope of the rights that
private parties holding emissions rights may assert”); see also Wilkinson, supra
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is in accord with Wilkinson’s suggestion that the doctrine might func-
tion as a canon of construction when public lands and the trust re-
sponsibility of a federal land agency toward those lands are at
issue.263
B. Objections to a Federal Public Trust Doctrine
Using the public trust doctrine in the way this article proposes is
sure to court “powerful enemies.”264  The fact that the doctrine “is
both a recognition of a sort of latent public property interest in natural
resources and a form of constitutional limitation on state authority, in
its more affirmative formulations it has been aggressively opposed
both by proponents of strong private property rights and by propo-
nents of broad state agency discretion.”265  Two frequently heard gen-
eral objections to the public trust doctrine is that it interferes with
otherwise applicable federal regulatory schemes and that it embroils
courts in matters best left to the policy branches of government.  The
first objection implicates the preemption doctrine; the second the po-
litical question doctrine.  As shown below, neither constitutional objec-
tion has any relevance to the use of a federal common law doctrine to
protect migrating wildlife.
1. Statutory Law Displaces Common Law Doctrines like the
Public Trust Doctrine
There is little question that existing federal laws displace or pre-
empt common law.266  This prudential rule recognizes “that the legis-
lature, through statutory law, has supplanted common law by ‘filling
note 1, at 310–11 (suggesting that the public trust doctrine might “operate as a
limitation on the discretion of administrative agencies” or “as a basis for the ulti-
mate hard look doctrine for reviewing agency action,” and also applying as a rule
of “construction of statutes against the background of a duty to the public,” which
could affect the interpretation of a many public lands statutes); id. at 313–15
(referring to “an action-forcing mechanism” requiring agencies to take affirma-
tive action to protect public “resources that many different segments of the
public”).
263. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 315 n.317; see also id. at 316 (“The trust concept can
be useful as a backdrop for judicial decisionmaking, as an aid in determining
legislative intent and as a yardstick in assessing administrative action or
inaction.”).
264. Redmond, supra note 157, at 305.
265. Id.
266. See Shaffer, supra note 166, at 175 n.15 (“Displacement analysis generally in-
volves a judicial recognition that the legislature, through statutory law, has sup-
planted common law by ‘filling the field’ formerly occupied by that common law.”).
But see generally id. at 190–95 (arguing that the District court opinion in Alec L.,
which found that even if a federal public trust doctrine existed, existing federal
regulations displaced the doctrine, was inconsistent with the origins and pur-
poses of the public trust doctrine).
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the field’ formerly occupied by that common law.”267  But here there is
no federal law that comprehensively applies to migrating wildlife, no
available federal remedy that the public might seek, nor the promise
that there will be one anytime soon given general congressional antip-
athy to climate change and overall dysfunction.  Applying the public
trust doctrine, in fact, would temporarily fill a federal regulatory gap
until Congress acts, if it elects to act.  The continuing failure of the
political branches of government to address the problem of migrating
climate-stressed wildlife leaves room for the judiciary to act.268  Appli-
cation of a federalized public trust doctrine in this situation renders
no law or regulatory scheme “meaningless,”269 and thus is different
from that confronting the plaintiffs in Alec L., who unsuccessfully
sought the application of the federal public trust doctrine, where “[t]he
existence of a legislative scheme addressing greenhouse-gas emissions
required the plaintiffs to bring claims under those statutes.”270
Federal agencies are not yet seriously thinking about, let alone
planning for, climate-driven wildlife migrants.271  According to Cama-
cho and Glicksman, “the statutory regimes that govern management
of official wilderness and the national parks are rooted in historical
and wildness preservation goals that impair agencies’ ability to meet
climate-related threats.”272  While the emphasis on protection of eco-
logical functions reflected in the organic statute governing the activi-
267. Id. (citing Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537
(2011); Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 856 (9th
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013); Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 800 (7th Cir. 2011)).
268. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 159, at 313–14.
269. Id. at 305 (applying this analysis to the Clean Air Act).  However, unlike the
Clean Air Act (CAA), some federal laws that apply to natural resources hint at a
federal trust responsibility.  So while the public trust doctrine might duplicate
those responsibilities, it would not conflict with them, and in all likelihood en-
hance them. See id. at 309 (supplementing the statutory and regulatory scheme
of the CAA with the public trust doctrine would not render those schemes
“meaningless”).
270. Shaffer, supra note 166, at 181 (stating “Alec L. v. Jackson represents the first
clear assertion by the federal courts that statutory displacement applies in the
public trust context”).
271. Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 100, at 816 (“Climate change adaptation has
been almost entirely absent from wilderness management.”); see id. (“[T]he NPS
has not moved much beyond information-gathering and establishment of plan-
ning frameworks, and the FWS has gone somewhat (but not considerably) further
than the NPS.”  BLM’s climate-related posture is “neither notably beyond nor
behind what its past management priorities might have predicted.”); id. at 814
(“[E]ven if some BLM lands may be less ecologically rich than other federal lands,
this may change (or need to change) as the climate does.  The nearly 248 million
acres of BLM lands—the largest of the federal land agencies—may be essential
components of a resilient approach to resource management as climate conditions
shift and biota need to migrate to more compatible locations.”).
272. Id. at 816.
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ties of the Fish and Wildlife Service would seem to make it more
responsive to climate change, the agency “has to a certain degree tied
its own hands by interpreting its mandate as oriented toward histori-
cal preservation.”273  Even the National Forest Service, which may be
the most advanced of the land management agencies in its commit-
ment to climate change adaptation,274 is included in Camacho and
Glicksman’s recommendation that all the federal land management
agencies pursue a much more aggressive hands-on management pos-
ture in their management approaches to make them more responsive
to climate change.275
In short, no federal land management law directly addresses cli-
mate change nor are the agencies charged with implementing those
laws planning in any way to respond to climate change, let alone the
specific issues facing climate-driven wildlife migrants.  This leaves a
substantial gap that judicious use of a federalized public trust doc-
trine by courts could temporarily fill until displaced by new federal
laws or regulations.
2. The Public Trust Doctrine Invites Courts to Intrude in Policy
Making by the Political Branches
In Alec L. the court balked at what it viewed as a request to craft
policy, thereby invading the role of the legislature in violation of the
separation of powers doctrine.276  But judicial enforcement of fiduci-
ary obligations like those embodied in the public trust doctrine should
not raise political question concerns because courts are merely pro-
tecting the public against executive or legislative abuses of power,
which is a traditional function of courts.277
Moreover, use of the federal public trust doctrine in this situation
does not restrict legislative and executive actions from harming trust
resources, like the state doctrine usually does; it encourages agencies
to act to protect those resources.  The doctrine temporarily fills a gap
where there is no regulatory presence and might be used to supple-
273. Id. at 816–17.
274. Id. at 816.  The authors note how surprising this is given the Forest Service’s
history of being considered “a captured agency concerned more with maximizing
timber cuts than protecting ecological forest health.” Id.
275. Id. at 818.
276. Shaffer, supra note 166, at 181 (referring to Svitak ex rel. Svitak v. Washington,
No. 69710-2-1, 2013 WL 6632124 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2013)).
277. Id. at 196; see Sax, supra note 4, at 559–61 (explaining the interplay between the
courts and legislatures in cases involving the public trust doctrine, agreeing that
legislatures are the preferred guardian of the public weal, but that the public
trust doctrine has a role to play in democratizing the agency decision making
process); see also Torres & Bellinger, supra note 159, at 298 (“Importantly, judi-
cial inaction effectively forecloses the political question for future legislatures by
reducing the available policy options.”).
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ment and support whatever legislative and executive action
happens.278
The legal dichotomy [between the state and federal doctrine] is thus in high
relief: as the highest court in the land views it, the public trust doctrine in
state law empowers the judicial branch to overturn substantive choices made
by political branches of government.  The public trust doctrine in federal law
works to the opposite end.  In federal law, the doctrine empowers the political
branches of government to implement substantive choices despite objections
in the judicial branch.279
This Article has argued that the public trust doctrine imposes a
fiduciary duty on the federal government to protect wildlife, a natural
resource of national significance, which can neither be displaced nor
violates the separation of powers canon.  The Article has also sug-
gested that “[t]he modern public trust doctrine is firmly supported by
the principles of constitutional law and is an essential attribute of sov-
ereignty.”280  The Article suggests, alternatively, that the doctrine is a
constitutional convention, which invites federal courts to use it as an
interpretive rule when faced with a question involving a barrier to
wildlife migration.
The final Part of the Article proposes some changes to the federal
public trust doctrine that might make its application to migratory
wildlife as they move across private lands more politically salient and
effective.
VI. PROPOSAL
Each legal field has its own distinctive perspectives, institutions, and
policy instruments, as well as recurring controversies.  Broadening
our thinking about environmental policy tools to include more non-
environmental laws diversifies the options available to policymakers
and ultimately can make environmental policy more nimble, adap-
tive, and resilient to the vexing challenges it faces.281
The Article proposes that a federal version of the public trust doc-
trine be available as a tool to encourage the removal of obstacles that
wildlife encounter when they migrate across private property in
278. Pearson, supra note 236, at 175–76.
279. Id. at 176–77.
280. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 159, at 316 (“The public trust doctrine offers a
legal framework that citizens can use to compel government to fulfill its fiduciary
duties to protect natural resources.  The modern public trust doctrine is firmly
supported by the principles of constitutional law and is an essential attribute of
sovereignty.”).
281. Aagaard, supra note 114, at 62.
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search of more suitable areas in which to live.282  To say that this pro-
posal is controversial is an understatement.283
To lessen the controversy associated with the core proposal—the
use of a federal public trust doctrine on private lands—and make it
more politically salient, the Article proposes three modifications in
how the doctrine might be used.  First, a federal public trust doctrine
should only be used to protect wildlife that has some type of connec-
tion to public lands before it moves onto and/or across private land in
search of more suitable habitat.  In this way, public lands serve as an
anchor for the doctrine.  Second, the Article proposes a rolling public
trust doctrine that follows wildlife as it moves, allowing land that is no
longer useful for wildlife to be removed from the strictures of the doc-
trine as it rolls forward to cover new lands.  Third, individual property
owners can contract to avoid application of the doctrine, if they agree
to make their lands suitable for migrating wildlife in advance of the
doctrine’s application.  This aspect of the proposal allows wildlife sen-
sitive development to occur and includes the possibility that the doc-
trine might only be applied seasonally.
Restricting application of the doctrine to migrating wildlife that at
some point has been geographically connected to public lands limits
the doctrine’s application.  This modification reflects both the sover-
eign’s strong interest in resident wildlife,284 even when it leaves pub-
lic lands, and its trust responsibilities over public lands.285  These
282. An examples of other tools that might be used to increase protected wildlife
habitat in addition to those discussed in this article, Fischman describes a web of
federal, state, and local conservation programs like state wildlife action plans,
which contain incentives to protect wildlife habitat, and farm bill programs which
fund private conservation efforts on agricultural lands, and the importance of
integrating those initiatives into federal land management plans. Fischman,
supra note 84, at 51–52.
283. Forty years ago Joseph Sax commented that construing the Property Clause
broadly to protect lands adjacent to national parks “presents a problem—wide-
ranging displacement of traditional state land regulation,” noting in addition
that “[e]very expansion of the property clause increases the power of the federal
government at the expense of the states’ authority, and by the traditional juris-
prudence of federalism that is cause for unease.”  Sax, supra note 97, at 254.  The
same could be said about the application of a federal public trust doctrine.
284. See generally Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 176 (discussing the strong federal
interest in wildlife).
285. See Glicksman, supra note 221, at 183–90 (discussing various federal laws, such
as the National Park Service Organic Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act, and the National Environmental Policy
Act as imposing trust responsibilities on the federal government). But see Wil-
kinson, supra note 1, at 273 (“The federal public lands are at the outer reaches of
the public trust doctrine.”) (citing dictum in Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois saying
“that title to land under navigable waterways is ‘different from the title the
United States holds in the public lands which are open to pre-emption and sale.’
That language amounts to a clear finding that the classic public trust doctrine
does not operate on the inland public lands.”); id. at 275 (“Thus the common law
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responsibilities are similar to those the sovereign has under the public
trust doctrine.286  According to Wilkinson, “[t]he whole of these laws is
greater than the sum of its parts.  The modern statutes set a tone, a
context, a milieu.  When read together they require a trustee’s care.
Thus we can expect courts today, like courts in earlier eras, to charac-
terize Congress’s modern legislative scheme as imposing a public trust
on the public resources.”287
Second, the Article proposes a moving federal public trust doctrine
that rolls forward to keep pace with the migrating wildlife, if no other
legal regime is available to protect them.  This is, in part, a reaction to
the reality of climate change and the uncertainty of when, how, and
where wildlife will respond to it.  As the trust rolls forward following
migrating wildlife, lands that are no longer useful for wildlife could be
released from the doctrine’s application.288  This proposal is not that
novel as courts routinely allow lands protected by the public trust doc-
trine to be released for purposes not inconsistent with the trust or be-
trust is not direct authority for the existence of the public trust on the inland
public lands.”).  Wilkinson goes to great length to explain why the doctrine in its
“classic form” does not apply to public lands, including the history of land disposi-
tion, the comprehensive “legislative matrix” of public lands laws occupying the
field, diversity of the land base and managing agencies making it difficult to ap-
ply a single, unitary to all of the public lands, and the lack of wildlife or scenic
value of these lands raising a question of their suitability for a trust. Id. at
276–77.  Nonetheless, Wilkinson comments on the imposing and growing body of
case law suggesting that the public trust doctrine applies to the public lands,”
and that “the teaching of existing law seems to be that public land law has bor-
rowed important components from the public trust doctrine.” Id. at 277.
286. Wilkinson lists eighteen opinions, many of them by the Supreme Court from
about 1888 through 1970, that use trust language to describe the role of the
United States, including Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911), which Wil-
kinson described as a “cornerstone of broad federal management authority over
public lands.”  Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 281–82; see also Knight v. United
States Land Ass’n, 142 U.S. 161, 181 (1891) (directing the federal government to
be the “guardian of the people of the United States over public lands”); United
States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1981) (trust duties fed-
eral government has over federal lands prevent alienation of federal trust lands
in favor of private interests); United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 342 (1888)
(the Court over uses “specific trust language in describing the public domain as
‘held by the Government as part of its trust.’”).
287. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 299.
288. This concept is similar to so-called “ark easements,” which are “conservation
easement that can be easily terminated if its purpose fails because of changing
environmental conditions.”  Kimbrell, supra note 6, at 146–47. See also Olmsted,
supra note 8, at 70 (“Ark easements would represent strategically placed reserves
that could be used as stepping stones for migrating species.  Once it was deter-
mined that any such ark easement was no longer serving its ark purpose, it
would be extinguished and the proceeds would be re-deployed to serve similar
conservation purposes on new lands.”).
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cause the trust should no longer be applicable.289  Once land is
released from the doctrine’s application, what had been a seemingly
permanent cloud on the title of those lands lifts, allowing them to re-
enter the marketplace and local tax rolls unencumbered.  This modifi-
cation could potentially achieve a rough regional balance along
various migratory routes because as new lands within the corridor
come within the doctrine’s reach, other lands would be released from
its application.
Third, the Article proposes that the federal public trust doctrine
only be used to prevent the complete conversion of private lands to a
use that is hostile to the presence of climate migrants or to encourage
removal of barriers to wildlife migration.  Non-interfering uses of trust
protected lands would be allowed.  Thus, an owner of land in a migra-
tory corridor whose lands might otherwise be subject to the doctrine
might avoid its full application by entering into a restricted covenant
that requires the permanent removal of migration barriers or other
hazards to migrating wildlife, leaving the rest of the land un-
restricted.  Those covenants would attach to the property’s title, be
duly recorded, and be enforceable by federal or state governments or
the public.  Since it is highly unlikely that protection of habitat in
wildlife migration corridors will necessitate the acquisition of full fee
simple absolute title, conservation easements might be used to place
seasonal limitations on certain uses of this land.290  This flexibility in
the doctrine’s application would allow wildlife sensitive development
of lands in a migratory corridor.
But these are major changes in how the generic public trust doc-
trine is used today.  They are certain to generate controversy among
supporters of the doctrine’s use perhaps equal to the hostility of those
who oppose the doctrine’s existence.
The public trust doctrine “is an affirmation of the duty of the state
to protect the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, marshland
and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases
289. See Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 401–03 (1926) (finding consistent
with the public trust doctrine legislative grants of submerged and the deposition
of fill in those waters for purpose of future development so long as these rights do
not substantially interfere with public trust values); see also Coplan, supra note
5, at 329 (discussing the California Supreme Court’s decision in Mono Lake and
saying as the “California Supreme Court put it, ‘[t]he state must have the power
to grant non-vested usufructuary rights . . . .’  The key to consistency of such a
grant with the public trust is its sustainability—does the grant allocate such a
large portion of the public trust resource to current interests that it deprives fu-
ture generations of the equivalent environmental benefits enjoyed by the current
generation?”).
290. Fischman & Hyman, supra note 79, at 213 (“Acquisition of habitat in corridors
will rarely require purchase of a full fee simple absolute.  Instead, seasonal
habitat provision or limitations on just some potential activities on the site may
be obtained through conservation easements.”).
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where abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of
the trust.”291  This Article proposes using a federal version of the pub-
lic trust doctrine to enable unimpeded migration of wildlife across pri-
vate lands fleeing the adverse effects of climate change.  “An owner of
land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natu-
ral character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was
unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of
others.”292  Fences, roads, harvesting trees, filling wetlands, mining
and many other activities change the “essential natural character” of
the land and injure others by making unavailable essential habitat for
wildlife, on which humans depend for their survival.  To the extent
those changes “eat up the usufruct of the lands for several generations
to come,” then, as Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison, “the
lands would belong to the dead, and not to the living.”293
VII. CONCLUSION
Some day—hopefully—Congress will return to constructive
engagement with environmental issues.  In the indefinite meantime,
however, the legislative impasse presents a significant obstacle to
progress against environmental problems.  But, consistent with the
old adage that necessity is the mother of invention, that obstacle also
can be an impetus for forward movement, insofar as it can drive
environmental policymaking to consider underutilized and
unexplored alternatives to the environmental law canon.294
There will be no “one size fits all” solution to the environmental
problems created by climate change295; no panacea that will protect
wildlife fleeing the stress of climate change—there will need to be a “a
portfolio of solutions.”296  This Article recommends adding a federal
version of the public trust doctrine to that portfolio.  It finds little in
prevailing law or the doctrine itself that limits the doctrine’s use to
the state level and much that supports its viability at the federal level
for this use given the doctrine’s inherent flexibility, the federal gov-
ernment’s trust responsibility over public lands, and its strong inter-
est in protecting wildlife that inhabit those lands.  Alternatively,
courts might use the doctrine as an interpretative principle that in-
vites courts to take a hard look at any approval of those barriers by
291. Coplan, supra note 5, at 327 (quoting Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658
P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983)).
292. Id. at 326 (quoting Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Wis. 1972)).
293. Id. at 325 (quoting a Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6,
1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds.,
1958)).
294. Aagaard, supra note 114, at 61.
295. Craig, supra note 7, at 16.
296. Fischman, supra note 56, at 286.
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local or state agencies.  To make these suggestions more palatable, the
Article proposes that the doctrine’s use, including as an interpretative
trope, be cabined to wildlife who have spent some portion of their life
cycle on public lands where public lands can anchor the doctrine’s use,
that lands no longer useful for wildlife be released from the doctrine’s
effect, and that private land owners be able to contract out of the doc-
trine’s application by removing migration obstacles in advance.
Deploying a federalized public trust doctrine together with estab-
lishing better interjurisdictional coordination, protecting habitat
through a mix of private land use controls, cooperative agreements,
habitat acquisition, activity-based regulation, and use of the state
public trust doctrine, might give migrating wildlife a chance of surviv-
ing climate change in sufficient numbers to guard against their extinc-
tion.  Safeguarding the future of wildlife in the face of climate change
demands innovative legal thinking—this Article is one attempt to do
that.  The author hopes that it will generate discussion among sup-
porters as well as opponents of the public trust doctrine; even better,
she hopes that the federal public trust doctrine might be slipped into
the box of potential tools to protect migrating wildlife.
